University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1998

Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware
David A. Skeel Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Law, Public
Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Repository Citation
Skeel, David A. Jr., "Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware" (1998).
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 719.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/719

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

1998

Bankrup tcy judges and Bankrup tcy Venue

I

BANKRUPTCY JUDGES AND BANKRUPTCY VENUE:
SOME THOUGHTS ON DELAWARE
David A. Skeel, ] r.

*

I NT RODUCTIO N
Delaware's recent rise to prominence as the bankruptcy venue o f choice for many
large debtors has been dogged by increasing controversy. Cri tics note that firms that file
for bankruptcy in Delaware o ften are domiciled there but have no other significant pres
ence in the state . 1 They also complain that Delaware's bankruptcy judges are so interested
in attracting prominent reorganizations to Delaware that they will take only debtors'
.
mterests mro account.
.

Interestingly, Delaware's bankruptcy court is not the fi rst to come under fire in
recent years. I n the late 1 9 80s and early 1 990s, numerous publicly held corporations filed
their bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of New York, many managing to do
so through a j urisdictional sleigh t-of-hand.
For much o f this time, Delaware was largely off the bankruptcy map. But since
the early 1 990s, Delaware has rivaled and in some respects surpassed New York as the
venue of choice for large debtors. Although many of the complaints about venue-shop
ping h ave both Delaware and New York in mind, the most vigorous recent criticism has
been directed at Delaware's bankruptcy j udges. The criticism is not simply academic. In
early 1 997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed that state of incor-

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Associate Professor
of Law, Temple University.

1. A note on term inology. I will use "domicile" and "state of inco rporation" interchangeably th roughout rhe article. As we will see, there has occasionally been some question as to
whether a corporation's stare of incorporation is irs domicile, bur courts in recent decades have
consisrenrly equated rhe rwo.
Under the existing venue p rovision , 12 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994) , a debtor may file for
bankruptcy in any district where irs principal p lace of business, p rincipal assets or domicile is, or
where an affiliate has filed. It is the third of these options, domicile, that has p rompted the recent
controversy about Delaware and which is rhe subject of this article.
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po ration be eliminated as a basis for venue. 2 I f passed, the reform would essentially elimi
nate Delaware from the corporate bankruptcy picture, since relatively few firms have
headquarters or substantial assets in Delaware.
The purpose of this article is to consider both the merits of the Delaware venue
controversy - is Delaware venue a good or a bad thing? - and the question whether the
refo rm is likely to succeed. In doing so, I will emphasize two perspectives that are almost
entirely lacking in the existing debate. First, both proponents and critics of Delaware
venue h ave failed to fully consider the relationship between Delaware's rise to p romi
nence in bankruptcy and its role in corporate law generally. Commentators som etimes
recognize Delaware's preeminence in corporate law, but they almost invariably treat
Delaware's recent popularity as a bankruptcy venue choice as raising entirely differen c
issues. I n fact, the two are integrally related. Specifically, just as the efforts o f Delaware
and other states to attract corporations - a process often referred to as "charter competi-

2. See, e.g., Marvin Krasny & Kevin J . Carey, Editors Reply to an Anonymous Letter;
Why is Delaware the Venue of Choice for Philadelphia-Based Companies?, The Legal lnrelligencer,
M arch 22, 1 99 6, at 9 (proposal agreed ro in February, 1 997) . The National B an kruptcy Review
Commission (hereinafter, rhe " Review Commission" or " Commission") was established by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1 994 and instructed ro conduct an exhaustive i nvestigation of bank
ruptcy. The Review Commission delivered i rs reporrs, together with a long list of proposed re
forms, in October, 1 997.
Although the Review Commission's discussions attracted widespread attention from
practitioners and elicited a lengthy defense of Delaware by the Delaware bar, see Rep ort of the
Delaware State Bar Association ro the National Bankrup tcy Review Comm ission in Support of
Maintai ning Existing Venue Choices (Sept. 30, 1 996) (copy on file with author) (herei n after Dela
ware Report) , the issue first catapulted i nto the popular media when the Chief Judge of the Federal
District Court of Delaware, Judge Farnan, withdrew the standing order referring all bankruptcy
reorganization cases ro the bankruptcy judges in late January, 1 997. See, e.g., Ann Davis, Bankmptcy's
Main Court Faces Limit, Wall St. J . , Jan. 27, 1 997, at A3 ("highly unusual " withdrawal of reference
"stunned bankruptcy lawyers" ) ; Ann Davis, Delaware Bankruptcy Court is Target for A LLeged Bias
Favoring Companies, Wall St. J . , Jan . 28, 1 997, at B2 (describing withdrawal order and p roposal by
Review Commission ro eliminate domicile-based venue) ; Delaware District Court Withdraws Reftr
ence ofALL Ch. 11 Cases to Bankruptcy Court, Bankr. L. Rep. , Jan. 30, 1 997, at 1 23 (quoting with
drawal order) ; Del District Court Clarifies Order Withdrawing Reftrence ofCh. 11 Cases, Bankr. L.
Rep .. Feb. 6, 1 997, at 1 64 (quoting revised order). The order, and a subsequent o rder clarifying the
first, made clear Judge Farnan's intention ro scrutinize Delaware's reorganization cases . I discuss
the significance of this action in Part I I , infra.
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tion"- has induced Delaware to regulate corporate law in a generally efficient manner,3
the sam e fo rces will h ave a beneficial effect on Delaware's bankruptcy judges.4
To be sure, the beneficial effects of charter competition are attenuated in the
bankruptcy context. I am reminded of a recent Hertz rental car commercial, where a
hapless businessman is repeatedly asked if the inferior rental car company he has selected
offers the same services as Hertz, and he is fo rced on each occasion to answer, "not ex
actly." Because Congress, rather than the states, regulates bankruptcy, and bankruptcy
j udges are federal, state charter competition in bankrup tcy is "not exactly" the same as it
is in corporate law generally.5 Yet, because bankruptcy is so closely linked to other aspects
of corporate law, charter competition does influence the Delaware bankruptcy court.
Because of this, Delaware venue shoul d be encouraged rather than thwarted.
Second, the article o ffers a detailed historical perspective on the venue contro
versy. In contrast to most existing analyses, nearly all of which have considered only the

I should note that this statement is a contentious one. Commentators have long
3.
debated whether charter competition has beneficial or p erverse effects. Most famously, William
Cary argued in 1 97 4 that charter competition produces a "race to the bo ttom, " with states enact
ing unconscionably manager-friendly laws in order to attract corporations. William L. Cary, Fed
eralism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J . 663 ( 1 974) . Ralph Winter
rej oined, with a position now described as the "race to the top" view, that market pressures force
managers to seek and states to supply efficient regulation. Ralph K. Win te r, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory ofthe Corporation, 6 J . Legal Stud. 2 5 1 ( 1977) . Most current commen
tators take an intermediate view. I have described and defended my own perspective, an in terme
diate view tending toward the race to the top perspective, in David A. Skeel, ]r. , Rethinking the
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 4 7 1 ( 1 9 9 4 ) .
4 . A recent exception to commentators' neglect of the nexus between bankruptcy
venue and corporate law is Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas , Improving Corporate
Bankruptcy Law Through Venue Reform (I 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file wi th author).
Rasmussen and Thomas address several of the issues noted in this paragraph, agreeing with much
of the analysis but critiquing the ultimate proposal I made in Rethinking the Line, supra note 3 .
Although their article was completed too recently fo r m e to give i t the atten tion i t deserves, I d o
discuss their conclusions briefly in Part I I (F) , infra.
5.
To assure all of the benefits of charter competi tion, Congress would need to relinquish control over corporate bankruptcy to the states. I have argued elsewhere that Congress should
do precisely this, and that there is surprisingly strong historical support for state regulat.i on of
corporate bankruptcy. Skeel, supra note 3 . See also infra Parr II (A).
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recent debate, I show that the current controversy has a long historical pedigree.6 I focus
in particular on a series of debates during the 1 930s as to whether firms should be permi t
red to file bankruptcy petitions in their state o f incorporation. Then, as n ow, everyone
knew that rhe debate was really about Delaware; and the arguments for eliminating do
micile-based venue were quire similar to those being made today.
Nor only does the historical analysis underscore the connection between Dela
ware venue and Delaware's role in corporate law generally, but it also provides important
insigh ts into the political question of whether venue reform is likely to be adopted. In the
1 930s, D elaware initially protected but then lost domicile-based venue. My analysis of
these events suggests both that Delaware's role in corporate reorganization was precarious
and that the key factor in its initial victory was a well-p laced senator. Interestingly, there
are striking echoes of both of these factors today, and it seems likely that only a well
placed legislator - which Delaware currently has in Senator Joseph Biden - can pre
empt reform.
While my analysis focuses on the Delaware venue controversy, it is important to
keep a larger picture in mind. At bottom, the ven ue controversy concerns the quality and
efficacy of bankruptcy j udges. From this perspective, my defense of Delaware venue is a
contention that the desire to attract high-profile debtors will have a desirable effect on
Delaware's bankruptcy j udges (and on who is selected to serve as a bankruptcy j udge in
Delaware) .
But preserving domicile-based venue is only one way - and a somewhat lim
ired one at that - to enhance j udges' performance . I discuss two alternative venue re
forms, each of which could improve on the existing regime, at the end o f Part II. A
different, and still more sweeping, tack might be to alter rhe j udicial selection p rocess.
G iving bankruptcy creditors a direct say in the selection process, for instance, might
improve j udges' incentive to focus on rhe e fficiency of the reorganization process .7 Fi-

G. The one commentary that does include a historical analysis is the report p repared
by the Delaware State Bar Association. Delaware Report, supra note 2. Because the report considers
only a small piece of bankruptcy venue history- the treatment of venue in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 - it presents an incomplete and somewhat misleading picture.
7.
Professor George Triantis and I are developing and defending j ust s uch an approach
in a current work-in-progress.
·
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nally, and to take quite a different perspective, it may be that the centrali ty of bankruptcy
judges will decline as the parties make effortS themselves to improve the bankruptcy pro
cess.x
Nevertheless, even if Delaware venue is only one piece of the puzzle, I hope to
show in this article that it is a very promising piece and that it would be a great mistake to
thwart bankruptcy filings in Delaware.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide the historical context for the
current venue controversy, focusing in particular on legislative debates over domicile
based venue in the early and late 1 930s. In Part I I , I consider the no rmative question
whether Delaware firms should be entitled to file for bankruptcy in D elaware. In defend
ing Delaware venue, I discuss in some detail the connection between the Delaware bank
ruptcy court and Delaware's preeminence in corporate law. I then turn in Part I I I to the
political question, which I will consider in "public choice" terms, of whatever venue re
form designed to eliminate Delaware venue is likely ro succeed.

I. BACKTO THE FUTURE : A B RIEF HISTO RY O F
BA NKRUPTCYVE NUE CO NCE R NS
As i f to confirm the old adage that there is nothing new under the sun, the

treatment of venue issues in bankruptcy has followed a curious pattern : long periods
during which venue concerns remain in the background are periodically interrupted by
intense fights about venue. Rather than a new set of issues, the current debate about
venue - and in particular, debtors' desire to file for bankruptcy in Delaware - raises
many of the same issues that were vigorously debated in connection with the New Deal
bankruptcy refo rms.
The purpose o f this part is to give a brief but thorough history of bankruptcy
venue, with a particular emphasis on the current and New Deal concerns about Delaware
as the forum of choice for many large debtors. In addition to placing the current debate
in historical p erspective, the analysis will provide important insights as to both the merits
of the debate and the question of whether Delaware can thwart the e ffort to eliminate
state of incorporation as a venue option.
8. The increasing use of "emergence bonuses" in large cases is a fascinating examp le of
such a step. An emergence bonus is a commitment by creditors to pay a debtor's managers a bonus
if they confirm a reorganization quickly. Such a bonus cleverly coun teracts the incentive managers
otherwise have, particularly if they continue to focus on shareholders' i nterests, to delay the bank
ruptcy process.
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A. E arly History: E quity Receiverships
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Like American bankruptcy itself, the venue issue has an oddly b i furcated his
to ry, due to the fact that large corporate debtors rarely invoked the bankruptcy laws until
Congress added a corporate reorganization provision in the 1 930s.9 Rather than bank
ruptcy, large debtors reorganized through an equity receivership process first used to re
structure troubled railroads in the nineteenth century. 10 As a result, there actually were
two relevant sources of venue doctrine: the Bankruptcy Act of 1 898 and courts' decisions
on ven ue in equity receivership cases. 1 1
The Bankruptcy Act's ven ue provision, section 2a, had provided since the Act's
enactment in 1 89 8 that venue was proper wherever a "person" had "their principal place
of business, resided, or had their domicile . . . for the preceding six months. "12 B ecause

9.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1 89 8, America's first permanent bankruptcy law, included
only two disposi tion options: liquidation and composition. A lt hough the com p o sition procedure
was a sim p lified form of reorgan ization, it prohibited a debtor from altering its secured obliga
tio n s. For t hi s and other reasons, corporate debtors rarely filed fo r bankruptcy except to liquidate.
For a succinct description of t he reasons corporate debtors avoided t he Bankruptcy Act, see Henry
J. Friend ly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 41 - 48 ( 1 9 3 4) .
1 0 . The equity receiver ship process was developed, largely t hrough t he ingenuity o f r he
corporate bar, from traditional state law foreclosure procedures. In t he practice t hat evolved, firms
wou ld persuade a friendly our-o f-state (in order to e stablish federal diversity jurisdiction) creditor
to invoke t he foreclo sure process. The firm's managers generally would be appointed as receiver, i t s
underwriters wou ld fo rm "protective committees" t o assure the support of irs bondho lders, and
rhe firm would be "sold" to irs existing creditors. For a widely-cited overview of t hi s p rocess see
Pau l D . Cravarh, Reorganization of Corporations, in Some Legal P hases of Corporate Financing,
Reorgani zation and Regulation 15 3 ( 1 9 17) . I describe t he emergence of American corporate reor
gan i zation t hrough t he equity receiverships in greater derai l in David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolution
ary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 40- 47 ( 1 997) (unpubli shed man u script,
on file with author) .
11 . The principal limitation of t he o t herwi se helpfu l hi storical account given in Dela
ware Report, supra note 2, is that it considers only t he first of t hese sources, § 2 a of t he 1 89 8 Act.
Much of t he debate in t he 1930s centered on t he treatment of venue i ssues in equity receivership s,
due to t he fact t hat this was how corporations were actually reorganized p rior to t he codification of
reorganization in 1 93 4.
12.

11 U.S . C. § 1 la(l) (repealed 197 8) .

Bankrup tcy judges and Bankrup tcy Venue

1998

7

corporations were treated as " persons" and courts construed "domicile" to mean stare of
incorporation, corporate debtors could file for bankruptcy in their state of incorporation
under the 1898 Act. 13 This provision had little significance for corporate debtors until
much later, 14 h owever, because large corporations rarely invoked the Act's liquidation
oriented provisions.
What mattered much more

w

a corporate debtor was courts' treatment of the

ven ue issue in an equity receivership. As noted above, an equity receivership was simply a
stare law foreclosure action ini tiated by a secured creditor when a corporate debwr de
faulted on its obligations. 15 Despite the state law basis, many (and in rime, most) debtors
obtained federal j urisdiction by encouraging a friendly our-of-stare creditor to commence
rhe receivership. 16 Not infrequently, questions arose as

w

where venue could properly lie

for these actions.
In rime, courts developed several differen t approaches to the venue issue. Rea
soning that a "person" can have only one dom icile, and that a firm's domicile is irs stare of
incorporation, some courts concluded that the stare of incorporation was the only proper
venue fo r a firm's equity receivership. 1 7 A few courts reached precisely the opposite con
clusion, holding that venue should follow a firm's assets or principal place of business, nor
i rs state of incorporation. I X As often is the case, a majority of courts adopted an interme-

1 3 . See generally Note, Venue Under the Chandler Bill in Corporate Bankruptcy and Reor
ganization Proceedings, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 272 ( 1 938) (describing§ 2a of existing Act) .
1 4. As we will see, § 2a became relevant after the 1 93 8 reforms, b ecause large debtors
increasingly evaded Chapter X, which was designed to be the principal chapter for regulating the
reorganization of publicly held debtors . Section 2a app lied to Chapter XI, the chapter these firms
sought to invoke.
15 . See supra note 1 0 .
1 6 . An important exception, as we shall see, is that many firms invoked the state chan
cery system in Delaware.
1 7. See David M. Wright, Note, jurisdiction and Venue in Federal Equity Receivership of
Corporations, 23 Va. L. Rev. 29, 30-3 1 ( 1 937) (citing Maguire v. The Mortgage Co . , 203 F. 85 8
(2d Cir. 1 9 1 3) ) .
18. !d. a t 3 4 (citing Primos Chemical Company v. Fulton Sueer, 2 4 F. 45 4 (N . D .N.Y.
1 9 1 8) ) .
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diate position, and made a facc�based determinacion whether venue was p roper in a par
ticular location. The most frequently stated concern was the convenience of the chosen
forum for the parties in the case. 19
Even in these early years o f corporate reorganization, Delaware had a significant
and widely known stake in courts' conclusions about venue. By 1 920, Delaware had
displaced New Jersey as the leading state o f incorporation for publicly held corporations.
Although most commentators think only of Delaware's role in corporate governance is
sues, Delaware's p rimacy also extended to corporate reorganization. C hancellor Wolcott
in particular was well-known for his expert handling of equity receivership cases.20 Then,
as now, the question whether venue should lie in the state of incorporation was really a
question whether firms should be permitted to reorganize in Delaware.

B . Venue Reform in the New Deal
The New Deal brought a complete transformation of corporate bankruptcy l aw.
The transformation rook place in two very different steps. First, Congress codified the
equity receivership process, adding a railroad receivership provision to the 1 89 8 Act in
1 933 and a similar provision for other corporations in 1 934. 2 1These initial reforms were

1 9 . !d. at 36-42. Convenience to rhe parries has long been a central concern in b ank
ruptcy, and was seen by m any as the principal flaw in the Bankruptcy Act of 1 8 67. See, e.g. ,
Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 1 1 0 ( 1 93 5 ) . The 1 8 9 8 Act included several
provisions that imposed specific limitations on how many miles a parry would be expected to
travel. Similar concerns are at the heart of the current venue controversy, bur I argue in Part II that
rhe concerns are nor well-founded given current technology and demographics.
20 . Thus, in the hearings that eventually led to the codification of corp o rate reorgani 
zation, one speaker referred explicitly t o the effect that including corporate bankrup tcy in the
B ankrup tcy Act would have on Chancellor Wolcott's chancery court. joint Hearings on 5. 3866
Before the Subcommittees on the judiciary, 72nd Cong . , 1 st Sess. 570 ( 1 932) (hereinafter 1932
Hearings) (statement of Max Isaac, Editor, American Bankruptcy Review) . See also Wi lliam T.
Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, in Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware : 1 792- 1 992, at 2 1 , 37 ( 1 992) ( listing decis ion extending the
statutory power to appoint a receiver as one of rhe eight most important corp o rate law decisions by
Chancellor Wo lcott's p redecessor, Chancellor Charles M. Curtis) .
2 1 . Act of March 3 , 1 93 3 , 47 Stat. 1 474 ( 1 933), 1 1 U . S . C.A. § 204 ( 1 933) ( repealed
1 978) (§ 77, providing for rai lroad reorganization) ; Act of]une 7 , 1 934, 4 8 Star. 9 1 2 , 1 1 U.S. C. A.
§ 207 ( 1 934) ( repealed 1 93 8 ) (§ 77B, p roviding for corporate reorganization). I d iscuss the legis
lative history of Sections 77 and 77B in derail in Skee l, supra note 1 0 .

1 998
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stop-gap measures , enacted i n haste i n response to the Depression. I n 1 93 8 Congress
passed a second reform, the Chandler Act, wh ich rewrote both the corporate reorganiza
tion provision and much of the rest of the 1 898 Bankruptcy Act. 22 The venue question
received a surprising amount of attention at each stage of the reform process .
Let us begin with the initial codification of railroad and corporate reorganiza
tion i n 1 933 and 1 934. As first i ntroduced and passed by the House, Secti on 77, the
railroad provision, provided for venue only in the state of a rail road's principal place of
business or principal assets. 23 The initial Senate vers i on of the bill went further and added
dom i cile as another basis for venue. But d omicile-based railroad reorganizati on was not
t o be. During the Senate deliberati ons, Senator La Follette proposed that domicile be
stricken from the venue optionsY If reorganization could be based on state of i ncorpora
tion, he argued, "we may find that a great many of the proceedi ngs . . . wil l occur i n . . .
[states] perhaps thousands of miles away from the territory in which [the rail roads] are
operating and from the com muni ties in which they have their principal operating of
fices. "25
The floor manager- and principal expert- of the bill was Senator Hastings
of Delaware. 2" Senator Hastings proposed that the Senate leave domicile in, with the
expectation that the conference comm ittee would take a close l ook at the venue provisi on

22. Act of J une 22, 1 93 8 , 5 2 Stat. 840, 11 U.S. C. § 1 (1 938) (repealed 1 97 8 ) . The
Chandler Act was repealed in 1 97 8 , when Congress replaced the 18 9 8 Act with the new Bank
ruptcy Code.
23. See, e.g. , 76 Con g. Rec. 5 1 1 1 ( Feb. 27, 1 933) (description of the House and Senate
p rovisions on venue by Senator Hastings, floor manager and bill's principal proponent) .
24 . Senator LaFollette was the son offamous Wi sconsin p rogressive Robert LaFollette,
and was an important p rogressive in his own right. See, e. g. , Arthur Schleisinger, The C ri si s of the
Old Order 2 2 5 -26 ( 1 9 5 5) .
2 5 . 7 6 Cong. Rec. 5 1 1 1 ( Feb. 27, 1 933) .
26. Throughout the process, legislators frequently noted that the bill was p assed so
quickly that no one except H astings fully understood its provisions. See, e. g. , 76 Cong. Rec. 4884
( Feb. 24 , 1 9 33) (Senator B ratton, another member of the three-member bankruptcy subcommit
tee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, comp laining thar even he did not have sufficiem rime to
understand the entire b i ll) .

Delaware Law Review

10

Volume 1:1

while reconciling the House and Senate bills. 27 But Senator LaFollette s tood his ground,
and th e Senate approved his amendment deleting domicile from the ven ue provision.28
Congress' treatment of venue foll owed a strikingly similar panern in 1934, when
i t added a corporate reorgani zation provision to the Bankruptcy Act.29 As with rail road
reorganization, the House version did not include domicile as a basis for venue, but the
Senate version di d.30 Once again, a senator, this time S enator Hugo Black of Alabama,
argued that domicile-based reorganization would enable corporations to fil e for ban k
ruptcy in a state far from their principal operations. The bill as wrinen, h e contended,
"would encourage a continuation of the conditions with reference to the freedom and
laxness of corporate laws in certain states."31
In response, Senator Hastings defended Delaware's role as a leadi ng state of
incorporati on, and argued that corporations would file for bankruptcy in their state of
incorporati on only if there were n o obvious l ocation of their principal assets.32 After fur
ther discussion, Senators Black and Hasti ngs agreed to an amendment that would make
this pol icy explicit, authorizing domicile-based filing only if the pri ncipal place of busi-

27. 76 Cong. Rec. 5 1 1 2 (Feb. 27, 1 93 3 ).
28. !d. See also Max Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 H arv. L. Re v. 1 8,
27 n . 28 ( 193 3 ) (describing l anguage as arising from the exchange between Senarors Hastings an d
La Follette).
29. The continued imp ortance of Senator H astings, a conservative Republican, as
chronicled bel ow, is particularly striking given that the Democrats were fi rm ly in control by 1934.
3 0. Compare 77 Cong. Rec. 5 009 (June 5 , 1 93 3 ) (House version of bill, nor listing
domicile) with 77 Con g. Rec. 7886 (May 2, 1 93 4) (Senate version, includes domicile). Interest
ingly, the bil l that was proposed as an outgrowth of the 1 93 2 Thacher Report, whi ch in many
respects was the wellspring ofall of the s u bsequent reforms, had provided for domicile-based venue,
consistent with the Bankruptcy Act's existing venue provision. See 1932 Hearings, supra note 20, at
60- 62 (annotated vers ion of§ 2(a) of proposed bill). See also note 1 3 and accompanying rexr, mpra
(discussing § 2(a) of rhe Bankruptcy Act).
3 1 . 77 Cong. Rec. 7890 (May 2, 1 93 4). Senator Black's com ments reflect a deep skep
ticism of the effects of charter competit ion, which he anal ogized to the states' apparent "race" ro
liberalize divorce laws at that rime.
3 2. !d.
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ness or asset s were "controvened."33 Interestingly, although the Senate agreed to this amend
ment, the limitation disappeared while the bill was in conference. As passed, the corpo
rate reorganizati on provision was more generous on venue than ei ther the House or Sen
ate had been- including state of incorporation as a venue opti on, with no strings at
rached.34
What are we to make of these developments? At a general level , it is clear that
both sides in the venue debate saw domicile-based reorgani zation as an integral parr of
the l arger controversy about Delaware's success in attracting corporati ons. There was, and
continues ro be, a populist (and progressive) disdain for charter competition , since it
appears to benefit our-of-state i merests at the expense of employees and the communities
in which businesses are locared.35 It is therefore not surprising that the two senators who
most visibly opposed domicile-b ased reorganization, Senators Black and La Follette, had
populist (or, with La Follette, progressive) inclinations.
Interestingly, the venue debates ran directly counter to t he tradi tiona! public
choice assumption that populist interests play most strongly in the Sen ate3r,- recall that

3 3 . The amendment added the following language after principal p lace of business
and principal assets: "Or if the pri ncipal place of busi ness or the place where the principal assets
are located is controverted, then in the territorial jurisdicti on in which it was incorporated: pro
uided, that the court may, upon petiti on, di rect a transfer of such proceedi ngs to any territorial
jurisdiction where the corporation has a substantial portion of its assets, if satisfied that the in ter
ests of all parties would be better subserved." 77 Cong. Rec. 7 895 (May 2, 193 4 ) .
34. Act of J une 7 , 1 93 4 , 4 8 Stat. 91 2 , 1 1 U. S . C.A. §77 B(a) (1 93 4) (repealed 1 93 8) .
3 5 . The populist disdain for charter competition has nor disappeared . It i s n::>r acci
dental that one of the leading proponents of federalizing corporate law in the 197 0s was Ralph
Nader. See Ralph Nader, M ark Green, & Joel Seligman, Tam ing The G i ant Corporation ( 1976).
3 6. The rationale for this assumpti on is that small and less popul ous stares have greater
i n fluence in the Senate than the H ouse, due to the fact that every state has the same number of
senators. For an an alysis of the legislati ve history of the 1 97 8 Bankruptcy Code that finds evi 
dence confirming this intuit i on see Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, 96 M ich . L. Rev. 47 (1 997) .
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on each occasion, the House rather than the Senate passed bills reflecting the populist
position that d omicile should be excluded . The obvious explanation for this reversal of
roles is the effect of a single, well-placed senator, Senator Hastings, whose s tatus as floor
l eader and principal expert gave him particular influence over the outcome .37
One smal l puzzle remains, however: if Senator Hastings was s o influential, why
did only the corporate reorganization provision include domicile as a basis for venue? The
l ikely explanation is that Delaware had little at stake in the railroad context. Unlike other
corporations, m ost railroads did not incorporate in Delaware; and even those that did
would generally file for bankruptcy in the state where their m ost important assets were. 38
Thus, it cost Hastings l ittle to concede on railroad reorganization, and the issue may have
meant much m ore to populists, given the importance of railroads to m any m idwestern
and western states .
After the first set of New Deal reforms, then, state of incorporation was pre
served as a venue option for corporate debtors. The success was to be short-lived, h ow
ever. The 1933 and 1934 reforms proved, in a sense, to be simpl y a pause in ongoing
discussions aimed at a m ore pervasive rethinking of America's bankruptcy l aws. In the
mid-1930s, with increasing input from New Deal reformers such as Will iam Dougl as
and the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), C ongress considered

37. Thus, while populist appeals (most visibly, those of Hugo B lack) figured promi
nenrly in the Senate debate, Senator H astings managed to p reserve domicile-based venue for non
railroad corporations. Hastings' success can be seen as anecdotal confirmation o f recent arguments
as to the influence legislative committee mem bers have in the legislative p rocess through. among
other things. their prominence on the conference committees that resolve differences between
House and Senate versions of a bill. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional
Foundations ofCommittee Power, 81 Am . Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (1 987). I discuss these political issues in
more derail in Part I I I . infra.
It is interesting to n ote that Hastings' constituents were not u n i formly thrilled with h is
role in bankruptcy reform. Many Delaware lawyers would have preferred that things be left as they
were - that is, that firms reorganize through the equ ity receivership process. See, e.g 77 Con g.
Rec. 7891 (May 2, 1934) {statement of Sen. Hastings. noting Delaware lawyers' complaints to
h im about the reform effort) .
.•

3 8. As Senator Hastings himself pointed out in h is debate with Senator Black. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
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the proposals that eventually became the Chandler Acr.39 The reformers were adamanr
throughout the process about excluding state of incorporation from the venue options40
(and in fact were hopeful of m aking far deeper inroads on charter competition by enact
ing a federal incorporation statute).41 By the time of the principal Chandler Act hearings
and legislative debate, Senator Hastings was no longer one of Delaware's senators. 42 With
relatively l ittle opposition, the reformers succeeded in l imiting venue in C hapter X, the
principal reorganization chapter for publ icly held corporations, to the s tate of a firm's
principal place of business or assets.43
I n addition to restricting venue, Chapter X imposed strict governmental over
sight on the reorganization process, displacing a deb tor's managers with a trustee and
giving broad advisory powers to the SEC.44 The overall effect of the reformers' handiwork
was to sever the connections between corporate law and bankruptcy, and to diminish

3 9 . Un der the Securit ies Exchange Act of 1 93 4 , the SEC had been charged with in ves
tigating an d preparing a report on the use of protective committees in the reorganization process.
Securities Exchange Act of 1 9 3 4 , §§ 4, 2 1 1 , 1 5 U.5. C. §§ 7 8d, 78jj ( 1 9 34) . It was this report that
lan ded rhe S EC squarely in rhe m iddle of the reform process. For further discussion, see Skeel,
supra note 1 0, at 60-67 .
4 0. See, e.g. , Hearing on HR. 6439 Before the Committee on the judiciary, House of
Representatives, 7 5th Cong. , 1 st Sess. 1 83 (1 937) (statement of William 0. Douglas, SEC Chair
man) . Interestingly, the early versions of th e Chandler Act, which predated the S EC's involvem ent
an d were drafted largely by the National Bankruptcy Conference, also omitted state of incorpora
tion from the venue options. See, e.g. , John Gerdes, Section 77B, The Chandler Bi/1 and Other
Proposed Revisions, 3 5 M ich . L. Rev. 3 61 , 379 ( 1 937) (citing an d describing 1 93 6 version of b ill) .
4 1 . Joel Seligman pro vides a useful discussion of the unsuccessful effortS to propose
an d pass a federal incorporation stature in Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 2 05 1 0 (1 9 82) .
42. Senator Hastings lost his reelection b id in 1 93 6- a loss attributed by many to h is
adamant opposition to the New Deal reforms. See, e.g. , Charles J . Durante, Kingmakers, Nor
Kings: 1 9 00- 1 93 9 , The Delaware Bar in The Twentieth Century 527, 534 ( Helen L. Wins low, et
al. , eds . , 1 9 94) (hereinafter Delaware Bar) . Delaware did have a Senator on the Senate Judiciary
Committee during the late 1 93 0s , Senator James Hughes, but he, unlike Senator H astings, was
not on the bankruptcy subcommittee an d does not appear to have played a s ign ificant role.
43.

5 2 Stat. 84 0, 886, 1 1 U.S. C.A. § 1 2 8 ( 1 9 3 8) (repeal e d 1 97 8) .

44. 5 2 Stat. 840, 888, 1 1 U. S . C.A. § 1 5 6 ( 1 9 3 8) (repealed 1 97 8) . See also Skeel, supra
note 1 0, at 64- 65 (discussing mandatory trustee provision an d the controversy it insp ired).

14

Delaware Law Review

Volume 1: 1

managers' incentives to invoke che reorganization process. Scares l ike Delaware could no
l onger atuact corporate reorganizations, since domicile was not a permissible basis for
venue, and after the 1 9 30s, there were relatively few l arge-scale reorganizations in any
event. The change in Delaware's role was quickly apparent in the Delaware chancery
court. Whereas the chancery court previously had been well -known for its role b oth in
corporate law and with receiverships, the court's expertise centered on corporate l aw alone
after the 1 930s .

C. Venue in the Post- New Deal Era
As I have described in detail elsewhere, the post New Deal era was in many
respects a transition period for b ankruptcy. 45 The New Deal reforms crippled the elite
bankruptcy bar, and corporations viewed Chapter X as an absolute l ast resort due to its
draconian effect on managers. But the New Deal reforms contained the seeds of the
developments chat eventually led both to the bankruptcy process we now have in Chapte r
1 1, and co renewed concerns about venue shopping.
Crucial co subsequent developments was the fact that, although everyone kne w
Chapter X was designed for publicly held corporations, nothing in the Chandl e r Act
required that public firms choose this chapter rather than Chapter XI, which contained a

somewhat expanded version of the traditional composition procedure.46 An increasing
number of firms with outstanding issuances of public securities began filing u nder Chap
ter XI, a strategy che Supreme Court vindicated in the mid-1950s. 47 In time, Chapter XI
became the chapter of choice for publicly held corporations .

4 5 . The analysis of the next three paragraphs is drawn from the m ore detailed d iscus
sion in S keel, supra n ote 1 0.
4 6. For a thoughtful discussion, see Eugene R. Rostow & Lloyd N . Cutler, Competing
Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 4 8 Yale L.J. 1 3 3 4
( 194 9). In contrast t o Chapter X, which was almost entirely the SEC's handiwork, the S E C played
little role with Chapter XI or the remainder of the Chandler Act. The National Bankruptcy Con
ference, which was comprised of bankruptcy lawyers and l awyers' organizations such as the ABA,
was the driving force behind the changes in these other areas.
47. G eneral Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 3 50 U.S. 4 62 (1 95 6) (hol d ing that the choice
between chapters depended on the "needs to be met" ) . For further discussion, see David A. S keel,
Jr., supra note 1 0, at 7 1 -7 3 .
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In addition to providing much m ore flexibility- m ost i mportantly, by permit
ting a firm's e xisting m anagers to remain in control - Chapter Xl also al tered a firm's
venue options . Rather than Chapter X's restrictive standard, firms that filed their petition
under Chapter Xl were subject to the B ankruptcy Act's general venue provision.48 S i nce
the general standard l isted domicile as a basis for venue, just as it had prior to the New
Deal reforms, a firm that i nvoked Chapter XI could file in its state of incorporation if its
managers so chose.
In 1973, the Bankruptcy Act's venue rules were consolidated in Rule 116(a),
which provided separate s tandards for individuals, partnerships, and corporations. The
new rule, which was superseded with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1 978,
included only principal place of business and principal assets as venue options .
Given Delaware's status as the state of choice for publicly held corporations, one
might expect that when firms began to invoke Chapter XI, Delaware quickly became the
fil ing location of choice. Yet even as of 1 973, few firms made a special effort to file in
Delaware based on their status as a Del aware corporation. Why was this?
Several factors seem to explain the relative l ack of Delaware fil ings . First, many
of the firms that initially steered away from Chapter X and into Chapter Xl were medium
sized rather than truly "publicly h eld" firms.49 Medium -sized firms often are centered in a
single state and incorporated in that state. 50 At least early on, th en, rel atively few of the
firms using Chapter XI were l ikely to have been Delaware firms. By the 1 960s and early
1970s this pattern had changed, however, as even the l argest firms l ooked to Chapter XI
-which suggests that other factors must also have been at work.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, bankruptcy lawyers simply did not think
to file in Delaware. Few bankruptcy l awyers were l ikely to have remembered Delaware's
former status as an important reorganization venue, particularly given the near complete

4 8.

Bankruptcy Act § 2 a(l), 1 1 U.S . C. § lla(lO) (repealed 1 97 8).

4 9 . As Benj amin Weintraub and H arris Levin chronicled in a series of articles in the
19 5 0s an d early 1 960s. See, e.g., Benj amin Weintraub & Harris Levin, A SequeL to Chapter X or
Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Middle-Sized Corporations, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 292 (19 5 7) .
5 0 . D elaware's p reemi nence i n corporate law is a preeminence with respect t o p ublicly
held corporations - 4 0 % of which are incorporated in Delaware. For smaller corporations, it
generally is cheaper and more convenient to incorporate in the state where the firm is located. See,

e.g. , William L. Cary
1 99 5 ) .

&

Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1 25 (7th ed.
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separation between the practice of corporate law and bankruptcy practice. 5 1 T h e law firms
that encouraged their large corporate clients to incorporate in Delaware were no longer
the same firms that steered troubled firms through bankruptcy. Mo reover, D el aware's
j udges themselves could no longer claim any particular expertise in reorganization l aw.
Firms did engage in varying degrees of forum shopping, of course, but they generally did
not view Delaware as an important optionY
Together, these factors seem to have kept Delaware out of the limelight. Each
was to change in important respects after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1 978 .

D . The 1978 Bankruptcy Code and Thereafter
The 1 978 Bankruptcy Code brought sweeping changes to bankruptcy l aw, sev
eral of which m ade reorganization much more palatable to the managers of troubled
firms. In addition to combining Chapters X and XI of the old Act into a single reo rgani
zation chapter, Chapter 1 1 , the Code adopted a presumption that a debtor's managers
would remain in charge during bankruptcy,53 and all but eliminated SEC oversigh t . The
drafters were quite clear that they intended for Chapter 1 1 to encourage rather than
discourage reorganization , based on their view that troubled firms ofte n are worth m ore
as going concerns than in piecemeal liquidation.
In connection with their pervasive revision of the bankruptcy laws, the drafters
also adopted a new venue provision. The new provision once again i ncluded s tate of
incorporation as a permissible basis for venue, and also stated that a firm may file in any

51.

For further discussion of the separation, see S keel, supra note 1 0 , at 6 6 .

52. Notice that this offers a striking illustration of the effect institutions have on actors'
(here, m anagers' and their lawyers') perception of available options. The most prominent exponent
of this i nstitutional perspective on economic history has been Douglass North. See Douglass C.
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance ( 1 99 1 ) . My own view, as
will become clear, is that these limitations play an important role, but the adaptive process gener
ally tends toward efficiency in a context such as American corporate law and corporate bankruptcy.
5 3 . The presumption of managerial control arises from Bankruptcy Code§ 1 1 0 1 , which
defines the "debtor-in-possession," and Bankruptcy Code § 1 1 07 , which gives the debtor-in-pos
session all of the powers of a trustee (and i n doing so, implies that existing managers will not be
replaced by a trustee under ordinary circumstances) .
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jurisdiction where an affiliate has filed. 54 The provision was enacted with relatively l ittle
fanfare,55 but its terms l ie at the heart of the recent firestorm of protest about venue
shopping in bankruptcy.
As increasing numbers of publicly held corporations filed Chapter 1 1 petitions
in the 19 80s, choice of forum began to play a prominent role in the bankruptcy decision.
The clear venue of choice for these corporations was the Southern District of New York. 56
Although som e of the firms h ad a substantial presence in New York, others made use of
the broad flexibil ity b uilt into the venue provision; Eastern Airlines, for instance, used
the filing of a relatively m inor affiliate to establish venue for the m uch l arger core firm . 57
S keptics of these tactics argued that managers headed to New York to take advantage of
its manager-friendly posrure on issues such as extending the so-called "exclusivity pe
riod,"5g while defenders emphasized the value of the judges' sophistication in particularly
complex reorganizations.

5 4 . The new, and currenr, provision permits a case to be filed in the district:
( 1 ) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the
United States, or principal assets in the Un ited States, of the person or entity
that is the subject of such case have been located for the one hundred and
eighty days immediately p recedin g such commencement, or for a l onger por
tion of such one-hundre d-and-eigh ty-day period than the domicile, residence,
or pri ncipal place of b usiness, in the Un ited States, or principal assets i n the
United States, of such person were located in any other district; or
(2) in which there is a pending case under tide I I concerning such person's
affiliate, general partner, or partnership.
28 u.s.c. § 1 4 0 8 ( 1 994).
55. This is not to say rhe venue provision passed without comment. During the hear
ings, a few speakers worried that the provision gave debtors too many venue options, and as a
result would permit venue shopping.
56. See, e.g. , Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shop
ping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge. Publicly Held Companies, 1 99 1 Wise. L. Rev. 1 1 , 1 5
( 1 99 1 ) .
57. !d. at 22. See also id. a t 27 (Johns Manville filed for bankruptcy in N e w York de
spite having no substanrial assets there) .
5 8. See Bankruptcy Code § 1 1 2 1 (debtor-in-possession has exclusive right to propose
reorganization plan for first 1 20 days of case, and longer if extended).

18

Delaware Law Review

Volume !: I

Interestingly, Delaware played li ttle role in managers' thinking during t h e 1 9 8 0s,
and it was something of an accident chat first b rought Delaware to prominence. The firm
that put Delaware back on the map was Continental . According to widely repeated ru
mor, when Continental was considering its second bankruptcy filing i n 1 99 0 , i ts m anag
ers wanted to file either in New Yo rk or Atlanta. Because neither of these l o cations was
viable, the managers debated other p ossible choices on the eastern seaboard, and through
a process of elimination seeded on Delaware . In the wake of Continental's remarkably
smooth reorganization, other publicly held corporations followed suit.59 And the rest , as
they say, is history.
Even more than with the S o uthern District of New York, D elaware's emergence
as a venue of choice has provoked loud criticism, with striking echoes of the criticisms
made by Senator La Follette, Senator Black, and other reformers in the 1 9 3 0s. Earlier this
year, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which has j ust completed an exten
sive new study o f the bankruptcy system, made the criticism of Del aware (and to a l esser
extent, New York) concrete by proposing that the Code's venue provision be amended to
elim inate both state of incorporation and affiliate filing as bases for ven ue.60 I n e ffect, the
new proposal , which was formally approved by the Commission, advocates a return to
rhe N ew Deal reformers' approach in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act .
Shortly after the Commission approved t h e proposed amendment, i n a m ove
chat many commentators saw as connected in some way to the venue debate, Judge Farnan ,
the chief j udge of the District Court in D elaware, withdrew the standing o rder that auto
matically refers bankruptcy cases to Delaware's two bankruptcy j udges . r >� Consistent with
his announced concerns about the burgeoning bankruptcy caseload i n D elaware , Judge

5 9 . For a general discussion of the Continental fil i ng and its role in D el aware's rise to
prominence, see M ark D. Collins, Why Delaware?, Del. Law. , Fall, 1 9 97, at 3 8 .
6 0 . I n doing s o , the Comm ission adopted the recom mendations o f a m e m o prepared
by Larry King and Elizabeth Holland. Memorandum from Larry P. King & Elizabeth I. H olland
to Natio nal Bankruptcy Review Comm ission (Nov. 1 9 , 1 9 96) (on file with author) .
61. See supra note 2 (descri bing the orders). The standing order is an artifact of the
awkward relationship between bankruptcy judges and the district court. Because bankruptcy j udges
do not have Article I I I status, the federal d istrict court technically oversees bankruptcy cases. Each
district's standing order delegates this authority, for the most part, to the bankrup tcy j u dges in a
district. By withdrawing the order fo r chapter 1 1 cases, Delaware's district court thus took the
un usual step of asserting in practice the oversight authority it holds in theory.
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Farnan began assigning some of the new Chapter 1 1 cases to Delaware district court
j udges.
To appreciate the significance of Judge Farnan's order, we must first consider the
more general question of whether Delaware's rise to prominence is in fact m alignant, as
the Commission's proposal assumes, o r whether its effects should be seen in a more posi
tive light. Drawing on both our historical discussion and the academic debate over char
ter competition, I turn to this question in the part that follows.

II. BANKRUPTCY I N DELAWARE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE?
Critics of firms' effo rts to fil e for bankruptcy in Delaware (or New York) tend to
emphasize two kinds of objections: 1 ) the favored j udges are too sympathetic to debtors'
interests; and 2) the favored fo rum unfairly inconveniences a substantial portion of a
debtor's creditors.
We will focus m ost extensively on the effect of venue shopping on j udges , both
because it goes to the heart of the bankruptcy process and because the existing debate has
missed some of the most important implications of Delaware's recent rise to prominence.
I wilt emphasize in p articular the relationship between Delaware's bankruptcy j udges and
Delaware's general preeminence in corporate law. Although charter competition func
tions l ess effectively in bankruptcy - most obviously, due to the federal nature of bank
ruptcy l egislation - D el aware j udges still will regulate bankruptcy more effi ciently than
their peers in other districts. The analysis thus suggests that the widespread criticism of
Delaware is mistaken.
After exploring the relationship between venue shopping and Delaware's bank
rup tcy j udges, I consider the concern that a firm's decision to file for bankruptcy in Dela
ware will make it too costly for most creditors to participate in the b ankruptcy case, and
argue that this concern also does not weigh against domicile-based venue. I conclude by
considering two alternative venue reform possibilities.
Before I dive into the analysis, however, I should first give a more specific de
scription of the practices that critics of Delaware's bankruptcy j udges find obj ectionable.

A. What "Debtor-Friendly" Means in Delaware
As I have noted, the standard complaint about both Delaware's and New Yo rk's
bankruptcy judges is that they are too "debtor-friendly. " Critics trace this bias in debtors'
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favor to venue shopping, reasoning that j udges estab l ish a reputation as debtor havens in
order to attract the largest, most p ro m inent bankruptcies to their courtho use.
Although critics often suggest that j udges in Delaware and New Yo rk are debtor
friendly in the same way, the two districts actually have established quire different reputa
tions among practitioners - reputations that are amply borne out by their track reco rds
in large cases. The New York judges are known for their willingness to repeatedly extend
the exclusivity period during which the managers o f a large debtor are the o nly o nes who
can propose a reo rganization plan.62 Because extended exclusivity reduces the pressure for
a debtor's managers to act quickly, it can encourage long, drawn-out, costly bankruptcy
cases.
Delaware's j udges, on the other hand, have established p recisely the opposite
reputation. Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its speedy confirmation o f
reorganization plans.63 Many of the large firms that file in Delaware seek to confirm
p repackaged bankruptcy plans,64 and more traditio nal cases also tend to reach confirma
tio n quite quickly.65

62. LoPucki and Whitford described this aspect of New York's reputation six years ago;
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 56, and many commentators have noted i t since. See, e.g. , Federal
Judicial Center, Report to The Committee on The Administration ofThe Bankruptcy System, Chap ter
1 1 Venue Choice By Large Public Companies at I I I-7 (Jan. 9- 1 0, 1 9 97) (hereinafter Federal judicial

Center Report) .
63. See Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I l l-6; see also Delaware Report,
supra note 2 at 1 5- 1 7 .
64. In a prepackaged bankruptcy, a debtor's managers attempt to negotiate the terms of
a reorganization plan prior to filing for bankruptcy. To minim ize the length of the case, the m an
agers generally include the reorganization plan with their petition. Although the New Deal re
formers repeatedly criticized pre-bankruptcy negotiations in the hearings that led to the Chandler
Act, the 1 97 8 Code explicitly contemplates the use of prepackaged plans. See B ankruptcy Code
§ 1 1 26(b) (defining the parameters of prebankruptcy acceptance or rejection o f plans) . For a more
detailed description of prepackaged bankruptcy, and an argument that it should be perm i tted in
the b an k insolvency context, see David A. Skeel , Jr., The Law and Finance ofBank and Insurance
Insolvency Regulation, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1 9 9 8) .
6 5 . For specific figures o n this, see Delaware Report, supra note 2 , a t 1 6- 1 7 (average
time to reorganize publicly held firm in Delaware from 1 99 1 - 1 99 5 was 1 1 . 7 months, as compared
to 1 5 .7 months nationally) .
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Complaints about debtor-friendliness in Delaware focus not on extensions of
exclusivity, but on several D elaware practices that smooth the way for a debtor. Most
prominent is the j udges' treatment of "first day orders" - the requests for use of cash
collateral and for permission to pay employees, among other things, that a debtor often
files along with its bankruptcy petition.66 While most bankruptcy j udges delay their ap
proval until they can hold a hearing and give creditors an opportunity to respond, Dela
ware j udges often approve the orders almost immediately. One j udge also is known for
fielding calls from Delaware attorneys befo re a firm files fo r bankruptcy, and indicating,
among other things, which of the two Delaware j udges a case would be assigned to .67
One factor the Delaware j udges do have in common with their colleagues in
New York is their treatment of debtors' attorneys' fees. Both courts have a reputation for
generosity in granting attorneys' fees, a factor that obviously would sit well with an attor
ney who is helping a firm decide where to file for bankruptcy.68
The question, then, is how alarming are these tendencies? Are critics correct
that Delaware's (and New York's) efforts to attract debtors are having, and will have,
ruinous effects on the bankruptcy process?

B. Racing to the Bottom or Top in Corporate Law
As discussed in the last part, complaints about Delaware as a bankruptcy venue
are not new; similar complaints were made in the 1 930s. In the 1 9 3 0s, the complaints
were integrally connected to a larger debate about whether Congress should displace the
states as the principal regulator of corporate law. It is only by understanding the larger,

66. The orders presented for approval at the commencement of the case - that is, first
day orders - typically i ncl ude, among others, orders approving the retention of debtor's counsel,
approving the use of cash collateral, authorizing the payment of payroll, and authorizing the pay
ment of various orher prepetition expenses. For a l ist of first day orders approved in the Today's
Man bankruptcy, see Krasny & Carey, supra note 2 .
6 7 . See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 6 2 , a t I II-9 & I I I- 1 0 ; Ann Davis,
Too Much Bustle in Bankruptcy Court?, Wall St. J . , Feb. 5, 1 997, at B 1 . As I discuss below, many
practitioners suspect that Judge Farnan's orders withdrawing the bankruptcy reference were prompted
in large parr by these ex pane contacts.
68. See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I I I-7 (New York reputa
tion for high fees) .
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favor to venue shopping, reasoning that judges establish a reputation as debtor havens in
order to attract the largest, most prominent bankruptcies to their courthouse.
Although critics often suggest that judges in Delaware and New York are debtor
friendly in the same way, the two districts actually have established qui te different reputa
tions among practitioners - reputations that are amply borne out by thei r track records
in large cases. The New York j udges are known for their willingness to repeatedly extend
the exclusivity period during which the managers of a large debtor are the o nly ones who
can propose a reorganization plan.62 Because extended exclusivity reduces the pressure for
a debtor's managers to act quickly, it can encourage long, drawn-out, costly bankruptcy
cases.
D elaware's j udges, on the other hand, have established precisely the o pp osite
reputation. Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its speedy confirmation of
reorganization plans.63 Many of the large firms that file in Delaware seek to confirm
prepackaged bankruptcy plans,64 and more traditional cases also tend to reach confirma
tion quite quickly.65

62. LoPucki and Whitford described this aspect ofNew York's reputation six years ago;
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 56, and m any commentators have noted it since. See, e.g. , Federal
Judicial Center, Report to The Committee on The Administration ofThe Bankruptcy System, Chapter
1 1 Venue Choice By Large Public Companies at I I I-7 (Jan. 9- 1 0, 1 997) (hereinafter Federal judicial

Center Report) .
63. See Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I I I-6; see also Delaware Report,
supra note 2 at 1 5- 1 7 .
64. In a prepackaged bankrup tcy, a debtor's managers attempt to negotiate the terms of
a reorganization plan prior to filing for bankruptcy. To minimize the length of the case, the m an
agers generally i nclude the reorganization plan with their petition. Although the New Deal re
formers repeatedly criticized p re-bankruptcy negotiations in the hearings that led to the Chandler
Act, the 1 97 8 Code explicitly contemplates the use of p repackaged plans. See Bankruptcy Code
§ 1 1 26(b) (defining the parameters of prebankruptcy acceptance or rejection of plans) . Fo r a more
detailed description of prepackaged bankruptcy, and an argument that it should be perm i tted in
the bank i nsolvency context, see David A. Skeel, J r. , The Law and Finance ofBank and Insurance
Insolvency Regulation, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1 99 8) .
6 5 . For specific figures o n ch is, see Delaware Report, supra note 2 , a t 1 6- 1 7 (average
rime to reorganize p ublicly held firm in Delaware from 1 9 9 1 - 1 99 5 was 1 1 . 7 months, as compared
to 1 5 .7 months nationally) .
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Complaints about debtor-friendliness in Delaware focus not on extensions of
exclusivity, but on several Delaware practices that smooth the way for a debtor. Most
prominent is the j udges' treatment of "first day orders" - the requests for use of cash
collateral and for permission to pay employees, among other things, that a debtor often
files along with i ts bankruptcy petition.66 While most bankruptcy j udges delay their ap
proval until they can hold a hearing and give creditors an opportunity to respond, Dela
ware j udges often approve the orders almost immediately. One j udge also is known for
fielding calls from Delaware attorneys

before a firm files for bankruptcy, and indicating,

among other things, which of the two Delaware judges a case would be assigned toY
One factor the Delaware j udges do have in common with their colleagues in
New York is their treatment o f debtors' attorneys' fees. Both courts have a reputation for
generosity in granting attorneys' fees, a factor that obviously would sit well with an attor
ney who is helping a firm decide where to file for bankruptcy.68
The question, then, is how alarming are these tendencies? Are critics correct
that Delaware's (and New York's) efforts to attract debtors are having, and will have,
ruinous effects on the bankruptcy process?

B. Racing to the Bottom or Top in Corporate Law
As discussed in the last part, complaints about Delaware as a bankruptcy venue
are not new; similar complaints were made in the 1 930s. In the 1 930s, the complaints
were integrally connected to a larger debate about whether Congress should displace the
states as the principal regulator of corporate law. It is only by understanding the larger,

66. The orders presented for approval at the commencement of the case - that is, first
day orders - typically include, among others, orders approving the retention of debtor's counsel,
approving the use of cash collateral , authorizing the payment of payroll, and authorizing the pay
ment of various other prepetition expenses. For a l ist of first day orders approved in the Today's
M an bankruptcy, see Krasny & Carey, supra note 2.
67. See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I I I-9 & III-1 0 ; Ann Davis,
Too Much Bustle in Bankruptcy Court?, Wall St. ] . , Feb. 5 , 1 997, at B l . As I discuss below, many
practitioners suspect that Judge Farnan's orders withdrawing the bankruptcy reference were prompted
in large part by these ex parte contacts.
6 8. See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I II-7 (New York reputa
tion for high fees) .
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recurrem debate in corporate law that we can fully appreciate the significance o f D elaware's
renewed importance in bankruptcy.
In its current incarnation, the debate traces back to a 1 974 article by William
Cary (who, not coincidemally, had previously been chairman of the SEC) .69 Cary argued
that the competition among states to attract corporate charters leads to a "race to the
botto m . " Because m anagers are the ones who choose a firm's state of incorporation, states
have an incentive to tailor their laws to the desires of corporate managers. Corporate
m anagers are happiest if they have little accountability, and can run their firm however
they see fit. In their effort to attract corporations, Cary reasoned, states therefo re will
enact laws that are laxer and laxer on managers, and worse and worse for shareholders 
hence , the "race to the botto m . " The worst offender is the biggest winner: Delaware.
While Cary's pessimistic assessment of charter competition has proven enor
mously influential, it neglected to consider a single, crucial factor: the role of m arkets.
Al though states do have an incentive to cater to managers, managers cannot afford to
incorporate in states with wildly inefficient laws; not only would a firm that did so suffer
in the product and capital markets, but its stock price also wo uld fal l , thus m aking the
firm an attractive takeover target.70 In view of this, charrer competition may actually
produce a race to the top, with managers seeking and states providing relatively efficient
laws, rather than the dismal ones Cary expected.7 1
This perspective suggests that Delaware lawmaking is more l ikely to be p raise
worthy than lamemable. Much of the structure of Delaware corporate l aw appears to
confirm this benign view. Delaware's dependance on franchise tax revenues assures that it
will remain responsive to the needs of the corporations domiciled in the state. Delaware

69. See Cary, supra note 3 .
7 0 . This was Ralph Winter's principal insight in h i s critique o f t h e race to the bottom
view. Winter, supra note 3. Here, as in my discussion of the debate in the i n troduction, I have
offered a somewhat contentious account of the debate. Other commentators are m uch less opti
mistic about the curative influence of markers in this context. For an important recen t example, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: Desirable Limits on State Competition in Cor
porate Law, 1 0 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1 43 5 ( 1 992).
7 1 . Even on this view, however, state corporate law is likely to be only relatively effi
cient, as I discuss below.
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also has a small, efficient court system and j udges who are more expert in corporate law
than the j udges of any o ther court in the country.72
This is not to say that Delaware lawmaking is optimal in every respect. Because
markets are imperfect, and because it is relatively costly for Delaware firms to switch to
another state, Delaware can p ermit at least some inefficiencies in its regulation of corpo
rate law. The most obvious illustration of this is that several aspects of D elaware doctrine
seem to benefit a particular interest group, the Delaware bar, at the expense of a more
fully efficient corporate law.73 D elaware is notably generous in granting artorneys' fees in
shareholder suits, for instance, and has adopted a litigation-intensive approach to the
question of when such a suit can be dismissed.74
Despite these imperfections, however, state charter competition in general , and
Delaware lawmaking in particular, seems far superior to federalizing corporate law as
race-to-the-bottom theorists have proposed from rime to rime. In fact, there is a strong
argument that the states also should be given authority over corporate bankruptcy. Be
cause bankruptcy is an importanr component of corporate law, rhe same p ressures that
impel stares toward efficiency in corporate law almost certainly would cause them to
regulate corporate bankruptcy more effectively than Congress has done.75
What does all of this say about Delaware's recent visibility in the bankruptcy
context? There are obvious differences between existing bankruptcy law and a regime that
left bankruptcy regulation to the states. The question, then, is whether Delaware j udges
are likely to act as ifbankruptcy were truly a part of Delaware co rporate law, or whether
venue shopping will create some other kind of incen tives for Delaware j udges.

72. Roberta Romano has made each of the points in chis paragraph in a recenr book
(and in the anicles that p resaged it) . Roberta Romano, The Genius of Ame rican Corporate Law
'
( 1 993) .
73. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. M iller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 6 5 Tex L. Rev. 469 ( 1 987).
74. !d. It is worth noting the connection between Delaware's reputation for generosity
on fees in corporate law and the simirar reputation its bankruptcy j udges have in the bankruptcy
conrext.
7 5 . I have made this argumenr in considerable detail and considered the obj ections
and obstacles to state regulation of corporate bankrup tcy, elsewhere. See D avid A. Skeel , Jr., supra
note 3 .
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C. Delaware and the Bankruptcy Race
To understand the relationship between the Delaware bankruptcy j udges and
charter competition, we need to consider more explicitly the factors that must be present
for charter competition to take place. Two in particular stand out for our p urposes. First,
states cannot act as competing sources of regulation unless the area in questio n is regu
lated in some way by the states. Second, it must be clear that the law of the state o f
incorporation, rather than that of some other state, will apply when a dispute arises.
Because the states have long regulated corporate law, and the "internal affairs" doctrine
assures that courts will look to the law of the state of incorporation in resolving corporate
governance issues/6 corporate law satisfies both of these prerequisites - h ence the well
developed charter competition in corporate law.
In the analysis that follows, we will consider whether these factors apply to
D elaware's success in attracting bankruptcy filings. Although bankruptcy seems at first to
be an unlikely context for effective charter competition, we will see on inspection that
both prerequisites are at least partially met.

1. The applicability of D elaware law
The most obvious impediment to charter competition in bankruptcy is that
bankruptcy, unlike o ther aspects of corporate law, is federal in nature.77 Congress sets the
standard for recovering preferential payments or confirming a reorganizatio n , not the
states. With Congress supplying a single framework that applies in every case, the states
cannot easily provide competing sets of bankruptcy laws.

76. For a recent, ringing affirmation of this approach by the Supreme Court , see Dela
ware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 ( 1 993) . By contrast, if ordinary conflicts of laws p rinciples applied
to corporate l aw issues, and as a result the laws of states other than a firm's state of inco rporation
were frequently applied, charter competition would be seriously undermined.
77. I n the discussion that follows, I focus on variation within the federal component
portion of bankruptcy law. On issues not covered by the bankruptcy framework, courts have long
deferred to state law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S . 48, 55 ( 1 979), which underscores the
local role in bankruptcy negotiations.
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While the federal nature of bankruptcy law clearly interferes with charter com
petition, it would be a m istake to conclude there is no room for local variation. Quite to
the contrary, commentators have long noted that bankruptcy p ractice varies significantly
from j urisdiction to j urisdiction.78 The differences can be either procedural or substantive
in nature, or both. Examples of procedural variation include courts' different approaches
to hearings or first day orders.7� Substantively, courts have adopted different approaches
(sometimes by reference to state law) to issues ranging from the breadth of the p reference
p rovisions to whether secured creditors have a security interest in rents received during
the p endency of a case. 80 A wide range o f issues that fall somewhere between substantive
and procedural, such as the decision whether to approve a postpetition financing arrange
ment or to extend exclusivity, are similarly flexible in nature.
Thus, it quickly becomes clear that bankruptcy judges could develop a j urisdic
tion-specific approach to bankruptcy - one which distinguishes themselves from their
peers in other locations. The federal nature o f bankruptcy law limits but does not wholly
remove local control over the bankruptcy process, as evidenced by the distinct reputa
tions that Delaware and New York bankruptcy judges have developed in recent years.
2.

The question whether the "Delaware" approach will apply
The existence of a " Delaware" approach would not by i tself lay the groundwork

for bringing charter competition into the bankruptcy context. In addition to making the
l aws (or, as in b ankruptcy, applying them in a distinct fashion) , Delaware must also be
able to assure that the laws will in fact apply to a D elaware firm that files for bankruptcy.

7 8 . Much of the recent literature has considered dramatic variations among jurisdic
tions with respect to personal bankruptcy cases. See, e.g. , Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. Banke. L.J. 5 0 1 ( 1 993).
79. See supra note 66.
80. Congress attempted to reduce the variations among the districts on each of these
issues with the Bankruptcy Reform Amendments of 1 9 94. Thus, the revision Bankruptcy Code
§ 5 50 is designed to reverse the Seventh Circuit decision in Levitt v. I ngersoll Rand, 87 4 F. 2d 1 1 86
(7th Cir. 1 989) and to limit the parties from whom the trustee can recover; and the revision of
Bankruptcy Code § 5 5 2 is intended to assure that security interests generally do extend to
postpetition rents.
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Outside of bankruptcy, this prerequisite is supplied by the i nternal affairs doc
trine, which assures that Delaware law will apply to Delaware corporations even if the
dispute arises elsewhere. Delaware is better off if the parties li tigate in D elaware - local
litigation enhances Delaware's precedent base, for instance, and benefits the local bar. But
investors know that Delaware law also will be applied by non-Delaware courts, which
enables them to take the contours of Delaware law into account in valuing the firm.
The " Delaware" approach to bankruptcy, by contrast, does not offer the same
degree of portability. Because Delaware's approach stems from the way the Delaware judges
handle actual bankruptcy cases, Delaware has li ttle influence on cases filed elsewhere.
There is no analogue to the internal affairs doctrine to instruct non-D elaware j udges to
mimic the Delaware j udges' approach. As a result, the effects of charter competition will
only extend to bankruptcy if D elaware firms that file for bankruptcy routinely bring their
petitions in Delaware.
The analysis thus suggests mixed conclusions as to the connection between charter
competition and Delaware's recent prominence in bankruptcy law. On the one hand,
Delaware's j udges are subject to the same federal bankruptcy laws as everyone else, and
Del aware can only leave its stamp on bankruptcies involving Delaware corporations if the
corporations decide to bring their cases in Delaware. On the other hand, the bankruptcy
laws leave sufficient flexibility for the judges to develop a Delaware-specific approach,
and Delaware corporations do increasingly file in Delaware.
My own inclination is to view the glass as half full, rather than half empty. Even
imperfect charter competition seems preferable to its absence. Moreover, the seriousness
and sophistication of Delaware's corporate legal culture should, at least over time, m ani
fest itself in the bankruptcy context.8 1 In the analysis that follows, I suggest that strong
evidence supporting this optimistic view already exists. 8 2

8 1 . Roberta Romano has frequently emphasized the importance of Del aware's judicial
expertise. See, e.g. , Romano, supra nore 72, ar 3 8 & n.20. For a derailed description of rhe p rocess
by which Delaware chancery and supreme court judges are selected, see David A. Skeel, J r. , The
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 8 3 Va. L. Rev. 1 27 ( 1 9 97).
82. This is not to say the Delaware bankruptcy court is ideal . As I have suggested, some
of rhe recent concerns, particularly those about j udges' ex parte contacts with the Delaware bar,
clearly are legitimate.
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D. The Evidence So Far: Assessing the Delaware Approach

Thus far, I have argued in relatively abstract terms that the benefits of charter
competition should also have at least some effect on the Delaware bankruptcy court.
Over time, at least, the efficiency or inefficiency of Delaware's bankruptcy process should
be reflected in the value of Delaware corporations.
In this section, I take a closer look at several aspects of the Delaware approach,
in order to determine whether Delaware appears to be improving or undermining bank
ruptcy law. I also offer several predictions as to rhe future direction of the Delaware court
if Co ngress retains domicile as a venue option.

1. The Delaware specialty: prepacks and speed
As suggested earlier, Delaware's bankruptcy j udges have established a reputation
for speed. 83 In stri king contrast to New Yo rk, which has tended to specialize in unusual
and complex cases, Delaware has become the leading destination of prepackaged bank
ruptcy filings. Delaware's j udges also tend to confirm traditional Chapter 1 1 cases much
more quickly than judges in o ther districts.
Venue shopping in bankruptcy has rhus produced a clientele effect, with Dela
ware attracting firms that seek to reorganize quickly. Interestingly, several commentators
have argued that charter competition is characterized by a similar dynam ic outside of
bankruptcy. Professors Baysinger and Butler, for instance, contend that different states
specialize in attracting different kinds o f corporations. 84 While rhe theory has only lim 
ited explanatory power in the general corporate context, the process of specialization is
quite evident in bankruptcy. An obvious explanation for Delaware's striking specializa
tion is that Delaware is only one of several venue options, and managers have strong
practical reasons to file where their o ffices are located. 8 5 By holding out the prospect of a
8 3 . See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
84.

Firm, 2 8 J . L.

Barry D. Baysinger and Henry Buder, The Role ofCorporate Law in the Theory ofthe
Econ. 1 79 (1 9 8 5 ) .

&

8 5 . Recall that Senator Hastings made precisely this argument i n defense of Delaware
venue in the 1 930s. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For evidence that managers do in
fact tend to file for bankruptcy in the district of the firms' headquarters, see LoPucki & Whitford,
supra note 56, at 26-29, (suggesting that 36 of the 43 cases studied were filed in the district where
the firms' headquarters were) .
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prompt reorganization, Delaware counteracts managers' concerns as ro the disruptiveness
of an out-of-rown filing.
What, then, are we to make of these developments? Is Delaware's penchant for
speed desirable, or cause for concern? The obvious answer is that the Delaware app ro ach
has a great deal to commend it. To be sure, some of the criticisms of D elaware's j udges are
well-founded - most obviously, the complaints about ex parte contacts with members o f
t h e Delaware bar. 86 But D elaware has successfully addressed t he single biggest problem
with Chapter 1 1 in recent years - the inordinate time and expense of the reorganization
processY
One final note on prepackaged bankruptcies. Recent empirical evidence sug
gests that prepackaged bankruptcies are quicker, less expensive, and entail smaller devia
tions from absolute priority than traditional Chapter 1 I reorganizations. 8 � Yet one still
might debate whether routine confirmation of prepackaged plans is a welcome develop
ment. It is conceivable, for instance, that some prepackaged plans effect a redistribution
from scattered, general creditors to large creditors such as the institutional investors that
often hold publicly issued and privately placed bonds. Despite this and other concerns,
prepackaged plans seem on balance to offer an attractive balance berween the benefits of
an out-of-bankruptcy workout and of Chapter I I . For the firms most amenable ro a
prepackaged plan - publicly held firms with relatively uncomplicated capital structures
- the benefits of avoiding a full-blown Chapter I I process may be substantial .
In sum, Delaware's bankruptcy j udges have responded to venue shopping by
establishing a reputation for speedy reorganization. Although one could quibble as to
whether prepackaged bankruptcy plans are desirable, the fact remains that Delaware's

86. These complaints apparently were magnified by Delaware lawyers' word-of-mouth
advertisement rhar they could get things done in the Delaware bankruptcy courrs that would not
be possible elsewhere.
87. The cost and delay of chapter 1 1 has been widely criticized in recent years. For a
description of its sources, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , Markets, Courts and the Brave New World of
Bankruptcy Theory, 1 993 Wise. L. Rev. 4 7 1 ( 1 993).
8 8 . Elizabeth Tashj ian, Ronald C. Lease, & John J . McConnell, An Empirical Analysis
of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 4 0 J . Fin . Econ. 1 3 5 (1 9 9 6 ). Note that prepackaged bankruptcies
i deally might bridge the differences between out-of-bankruptcy workouts and full-blown chapter
1 1 cases. See Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidencefrom Finan
cially Distressed Firms, 52 J. Fin. 1 6 1 (1 997) (fi nding that firms reduce their leverage more in
chapter 1 1 than through our-of-bankruptcy workouts) .

Bankruptcy judges and Bankruptcy Venue

1998

29

j udges have counteracted the single most pervasive problem with Chapter 1 1 - the time
and expense the p rocess entails.
2.

Substantive effects - fiduciary duties and directorial elections
Less obvious than the relative duration of Delaware bankruptcy cases is whether

and h ow venue shopping will affect the court's decisions on substantive issues. If I am
correct that nonbankruptcy corporate charter competition will i nfluence Delaware
decisionmaking in bankruptcy, the effect should extend to specific substantive issues.
One set of issues j umps out as a particularly promising candidate for doctrinal develop
ment: the nature o f directors' fi duciary duties when a firm is insolvent and the related
question of whether shareholders are entitled to elect directors in bankruptcy. To show
this, I will briefly describe the recent case law on each of these issues, then speculate as to
how venue shopping may influence future developments.
In a series of cases in recent years, bankruptcy judges in New York and the
chancery court in Delaware have faced the question of whether shareholders can call a
shareholders' meeting during the bankruptcy case for the purpose of displacing the cur
rent directors.89 The request almost invariably comes when shareholders fear the directors
will support an unfavorable reorganization plan, and the practical issue is whether to
allow shareholders to use their nonbankruptcy voting rights as a source of bargaining
leverage. The existing case law concludes that shareholders can invoke these rights absent
"extraordinary circumstances," j ust as they could outside of bankruptcy, although courts
have denied the request on several occasions.90
Elsewhere, I have argued that courts' general sympathy for the shareholders'
p osition may be a perverse effect of the separation between state-regulated corporate law
and federal bankruptcy law - an effect I refer to as vestigialization .91 Because sharehold-

89. Prominent recent cases include Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. H olders Comm. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 8 0 1 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1 986) (enjoining meeting because i t would consti
tute a "clear abuse" ) ; Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Lionel Corp.), 30
Bankr. 327 ( Bankr. S . D . N.Y. 1 983) (perm itting shareholders committee to ask Delaware chancery
court to authorize shareholders' meeting) . I have commented critically on these cases in David A.
Skeel, Jr., supra note 3, at 506-0 9; David A. Skeel, J r. , The Nature and Effict ofCorporate Voting in
Chapter I I Reorganization Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 46 1 , 48 5 - 8 6 ( 1 992).
90. !d.
9 1 . Skeel, supra note 3 .
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ers are n o longer the residual owners o f a n insolvent firm, they have poor decision-mak
ing incentives and thus should lose their authority over the board of directors if the firm
files fo r bankruptcy. If anyone votes, it should be the firm's unsecured creditors. Yet,
because bankruptcy courts look to state law for guidance on this issue, and state decision
makers regulate with healthy corporations in mind, courts have concluded that share
holders should have the same powers in bankruptcy that they have while the corporation
is solvent.
Interestingly, on the issue of directors' fiduciary duties, several nonbankruptcy
courts have recently suggested that directors' duties change when a firm becomes insol
vent. Most prominently, Chancellor Allen stated in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, Nv.
v. Pathe Com m u nications Corp.92 that corporate directors must co nsider creditors' i nter

ests as well as shareholders' in the event of insolvency.
My analysis of venue shopping predicts that the return of bankruptcy cases to
Delaware will counteract the effects of vestigialization, and that Delaware's chancery and
bankruptcy courts will develop an increasingly consistent, coherent app ro ach to these
issues. Most obviously, I would expect the courts to develop a strong p resumption against
permitting shareholders to elect new directors in bankruptcy, at least in the contexts where
the issue has tended to arise.93
At first glance, a recent decision in the Marvel reorganization might appear to
belie my prediction. In Marvel, the district court upheld a shareholders' meeting request
that was quite explicitly designed to displace Marvel's current board of directors.94 AI-

92. No. Civ. A. 1 2 1 50 , 1 9 9 1

WL

2776 1 3 ( Del . Ch. Dec. 30, 1 99 1 ) .

93. As suggested in the text, the issue arises well after the bankruptcy filing, in the
context of negotiations on a particular reorganization plan. By contrast, one can i m agine Delaware
j udges permitting a shareholder vote earlier in a case if, for instance, a group of shareholders wishes
to challenge the filing.
In fai rness, I should note that, even if my predictions were to p rove p rescient, i t m ight
not provide conclusive evidence that venue shopping has benign effects. One could also i nterpret
the developments in other ways. Removing shareholders' right to replace d i rectors, for instance,
could be viewed as a means of insulating directors from scrutiny - particularly if the right to
replace d irectors were simply eliminated rather than given to creditors.
94. Official Bondholders Committee v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. (In re Mar
vel) , C.A. No. 97- 1 46-RRM, slip op. at 12 (D. Del. May 1 4 , 1 997) ( " (i ] t is well settled that the
right of shareholders to compel a shareholders' meeting . . . subsists during reorganization proceed
i ngs. " ) .
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though the opinion carries ringing endorsements o f shareholders' right t o invoke their
voting rights in bankruptcy, the context in which the decision arose puts it in a somewhat
different light. The "shareholders" in the case were a group of bondholders, led by Carl
Icahn, who became shareholders when the bankruptcy court permitted them to foreclose
on stock that Ronald Perelman of Marvel had pledged to secure the bonds.95 Thus, the
effect of the decision is to permit a group o f creditors to replace Marvel's directors, a result
much more in line with the position I have argued for than the language of the opinion
might suggest.
It is still too early to state with any certainty how venue shopping will affect
Delaware decision-making on substantive issues. But my analysis suggests both that it
will have an effect, and that the effect is likely to be a generally desirable one.

3. Judicial expertise and judicial culture
Thus far, I have offered evidence and a bit of speculation in support of my
contention that charter competition will beneficially influence Delaware bankruptcy cases.
The fact that Congress rather than the states regulates bankruptcy seriously dilutes the
effect, but Delaware still has enough flexibility to leave its stamp on bankruptcy law. In
this subsection , we turn more directly to the j udges themselves. Once again, we will see
both that federal regulation interferes with state decision-making, and that Delaware's
influence nevertheless shines through.
An important part of Delaware's success in corporate law lies in its remarkable
j udiciary. As befits Delaware's longstanding preeminence in corporate law, Delaware's
j udges as a group offer more expertise and sophistication than those of any other court in

95. Moreover, some observers suspect that Judge Farnan's order withdrawi ng the bank
ruptcy court's reference may have influenced the sequence of events that shifted authority to the
Marvel bondholders. See, e.g. Ann Davis, Delaware Court's Actions in Marvel Case Viewed as Mes
sage to Corporate Debtors, Wall St. J . , June 3 0 , 1 997, at B 1 2 .
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the country.96 Moreover, the state's careful selection process, i n which the corporate bar
plays a prominent role, is carefully designed to assure that things stay this way.97
Because bankruptcy j udgeships are federal, Delaware's bankruptcy j udges are
chosen through an entirely differen t process. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the
federal court of appeals.98 Thus, the federal judges of the Third Circuit, rather than Dela
ware, determine who will fill Delaware's bankruptcy court.
Yet this is not the end of the story. Although Delaware does n o t have formal
authority over the selection of bankruptcy j udges, as a practical matter its bar is likely to
be the principal source of nominees. And in fact this has proven to be the case. The
practice that has developed in the Third Circuit, as in other circuits, is to assemble a list of
nominations - generally provided by the local bar - which is fo rwarded to the Third
Circuit. Bankruptcy j udgeships are then filled from the list of nominees.99
Given the obvious value of a vigorous corporate bankruptcy practice to the Dela
ware bar, the bar can be expected to exercise some of the same care in n o m inating bank
ruptcy j udges that it does with Delaware chancery and supreme court j udges. It is too
early to tell for sure, but the selection of Delaware's two current bankruptcy judges seems
to confirm this prediction. When Delaware's senior bankruptcy judge, Judge Helen Balick,

96. See supra note 8 1 and accompanying text. For an exploration of the way in which
the Delaware courts establ ish standards of corporate behavior, often through opinions that distin
guish in quasi- moral terms between appropriate and inappropriate directorial p erformance, see
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? , 4 4 U . C . L.A. L.
Rev. 1 009 ( 1 9 97). See also Skeel, supra note 8 1 , at 1 63-72 (describing "moral di mension" in Dela
ware decision m aking) .
97. For a detailed discussion of Delaware's j udicial selection p rocess, see David A. S keel,
Jr. , supra note 8 1 .
9 8 . See 28 U . S . C. § 1 52(a) ( l ) (court of appeals to make appointments "after consider
ing the recommendations of the Judicial Conference") .
99. More p recisely, the j udicial council o f each court o f appeals i s responsible for mak
ing recommendations to the circuit court. The Judicial Conference recommends that the j udicial
councils appoint a merit selection panel with at least three members to assist them in assembling
nominations. The merit selection panel is expected to submit five to ten n ames to the judicial
council, which then submits at least three nominees to the court of appeals. For a detailed descrip
tion of the selection process, see Administrative Office ofThe United States Courts, The Selection
and Ap pointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges , at 9- 1 0 ( 1 994) (merit selection panels); id.
at 1 8- 2 1 (submission of names) .
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was selected in 1 9 8 4 , Delaware's bankruptcy court had no particular prominence; and
the selection process drew little of the attention that chancery and state supreme court
judgeships receive. 1 00
By 1 99 1 , when Delaware added a second bankruptcy judge, Peter Walsh, things
were j ust beginning to change. The Continental case had pur Delaware on the map, and
the connection ro Delaware's role in corporate law was becoming more clear. The Dela
ware bar took a more active i nterest in the selection process; it almost certainly will take
an even greater interest in future appointment decisions, and will exercise the same kind
of care as it does with the chancery and supreme court nominations. Moreover, o nce they
are selected, Delaware's j u dges become p art of the same corporate culture that has played
so prominent a role in corporate law generally.
It is important ro emphasize that the selection of bankruptcy judges is "not
exactly" (to return to the commercial I described in the I ntroduction to this article) like
Delaware's selection of chancery and supreme court j udges. The Third Circuit can, if it
wishes, completely circumvent the Delaware bar in its selection of bankruptcy j udges fo r
the District of Delaware. Nevertheless, under ordinary circumstances, rhe Delaware bar
will play an important role and will select for many of rhe same qualities we see in Delaware's
regulation of corporate law.

4. Delaware's dance with Congress
I n order to further underscore the connection between Delaware's roles in cor
po rate law and bankruptcy, I conclude this discussion of "evidence" by returning to the
recent orders withdrawing the bankruptcy court's reference.
As noted earlier, in February, 1 9 97, after the controversy over Delaware venue

had spurred the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to adopt its proposal to elimi
nate domicile-based venue, Chief Judge Farnan of the District Court reversed the auto
matic reference of Chapter 1 1 cases to the bankruptcy j udges. 1 0 1 His order, as clarified in
a subsequent order, announced that rhe district court judges would begin overseeing � orne
of Delaware's bankruptcy cases.

1 00 . This is not intended to be a comment on Judge Balick, who is rightly perceived to
be a talented bankruptcy j udge. Rather, my focus is on the nature and competitiveness of the
selection process.
1 0 1 . See supra note 2.
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Observers were quick w suspect a connection between Judge Farnan's order and
the precarious status of Delaware venue. What no one seems to have n oticed, however, is
that the sequence of events finds a fascinating echo in Delaware's regulation of corporate
law. In the late 1 970s, as Ralph Nader and o thers pressed Congress to enact a federal
incorporation statute, the Delaware Supreme Court engaged in a starding shift in direc
tion in i ts treatment of a controversial issue: freezeout mergers used by firms to eliminate
their minority shareholders.102 The principal effect was to subject the transactions to much
greater scrutiny, and as a result to defuse critics' claims that Delaware was too lax on
managers and o ther insiders . 1 03 Some commentators have drawn a s i milar connection
between the court's 1 9 8 9 decision in Time-Warner, 1 0 4 which made it m o re difficult to
effectuate hostile takeovers, and prior efforts to p rod Congress to enact federal anti takeover
legislation. In each case, the Delaware Supreme Court cleverly preempted federal legisla
tion by, in effect, saying "we get the message. "
I t i s i mportant not t o overstate the case that Judge Farnan's order was similarly
designed to dissuade Congress from eliminating domicile-based venue. The o rder i tself
pointed to Delaware's overcrowded docket as the reason fo r asserting district court con
trol over the bankruptcy docket; and several members of the Delaware bar have suggested
to me that Judge Farnan was simply angry at reports of ex parte contact between Dela-

1 02. The principal shift came i n Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 ( Del. 1 977) . The
Delaware Supreme Court quickly retreated from Singer; see Tanzer v. Internodal Gen. I ncus. , 379
A. 2d 1 1 2 1 (Del. 1 977) ; and subsequently abandoned it. See, e.g., Weinberger v. U O P, Inc., 4 5 7
A. 2d 70 1 (Del. 1 9 8 3 ) .
1 03 . A member o f the Delaware bar offers a nicely understated account of the dance
between Delaware and Congress: "The [debate over whether to enact a federal incorporatio n stat
ute] was conducted in law journals and on the seminar circuit for several years but eventually
subsided without congressional intervention after the Delaware Supreme Court rendered a series
of decisions upholding minority challenges to corporate actions. Whether the decisions repre
sented a shift in approach . . . became a moot point when the critics chose to view them as a re
sponse to their concerns." David A. Drexler, The Growth of Corporate Law, in Delaware Bar, supra
n ote 42, at 5 8 3 , 5 96-97.
1 04 . Paramount Comm unications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 5 7 1 A.2d 1 1 4 0 (Del . 1 98 9 ) .
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ware bankruptcy j udges and the bar. 105 Moreover, Judge Farnan is not viewed as part of
th e "in gro up" by t h e Delaware corporate bar, which suggests that he ma y be less likely
than , say, a D elaware chancery or supreme court judge to respond to the p erceived best
interests of the D elaware corporate law culture.
Yet the order came too close on the heels of the venue controversy fo r the echoes
of the corporate law shifts to be dismissed. Further, even if the impetus for the order was
anger over reports of ex parte contacts, it nevertheless reflects a remarkable responsiveness
to co ncerns about D elaware practice.
This responsiveness has important implications for the analysis of this part. On
the corporate law side, even die-hard critics of Delaware's role in corporate law have
acknowledged that the threat of federalization has had beneficial e ffects on Delaware
lawmaking. 1 06 By analogy, this suggests that the threat that Congress will end domicile
based venue should assuage the concerns of those who are not persuaded that charter
competition will, by i tself, steer Delaware bankruptcy practice in the right direction.

E. The Problem of Creditor Inconvenience
Our analysis of charter competition has assumed that bankruptcy is simply an
element of corporate law, and is influenced by essentially the same forces . While this is
largely true, there is at l east one important difference. Unlike other corporate law issues,
which tend to involve two-party disputes between shareholders and directors, bankruptcy
also implicates a large category of third parries: the creditors of the fi rm. It is in co nsider
ing this additional constituency that we come to the second major concern with Dela
ware ven ue, the concern that Delaware filings will inconvenience the firm's creditors. 1 07
1 0 5 . Another lawyer suggested that Judge Farnan was angry because the bankruptcy
judges had submitted a request for additional bankruptcy judgeships without i n forming him fi rst.
Following the order and the controversy ir provoked, a group of Delaware lawyers mer privately
with Judge Farnan on a weekly basis to discuss rhe status of Delaware bankruptcy court p ractice.
1 06. Melvin Eisenberg, co-author with the late William Cary and similarly skeptical of
Del aware's role i n corporate law, stares i n their casebook, for instance, that " [o)ver rhe past ten or
fifteen years, Delaware's position on statutory innovations has been moderate, and often even
statesman-like;" Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1 29-30; and concl udes that the threat of
federal regulation has made i t "no longer fai r to say that Delaware is leading the race to the corpo
rate bottom . " !d. at 1 3 1 .
1 07 . As we saw i n our historical debate over bankruptcy ven ue, see Parr I(B), supra, these
concerns about creditor inconvenience have a long history.
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The concern can b e seen most vividly i f we consider a firm whose o nly real
conracr with Delaware is its status as a Delaware corporation. Suppose that the firm does
much of its business in California, and many of its creditors, such as its suppliers, are
located there. If bankruptcy were filed in Delaware, the costs of participation for Califo r
nia creditors might be prohibitive, whereas a California filing would be within reach.
Eliminating domicile-based venue, the reasoning goes, would force firms to file in a more
convenienr location. 1 08
While creditor inconvenience is a genuine concern, there are several reasons to
believe it does not call for ending domicile-based venue. First, it is important to keep in
mind that the firms that choose Delaware as a venue location nearly always are publicly
held. The vast maj ority of firms are closely held and incorporate locally. With these firms,
there will never be any serious question about venue. Moreover, those firms that are pub
licly held often do business in numerous states. As a result, any filing location is l ikely to
inconvenience a significanr number of creditors.
Second, the managers of a firm have a significanr incentive to avoid venues that
are i nconven ient to the firm's headquarters. 1 09 If the bankruptcy is likely to be time
consuming, filing in a distant locale would mean serious disruption to their own work
schedules, as the managers traveled to the bankruptcy forum to appear in hearings. The
managers of Dow-Corning, for instance, have been quoted as saying they never consi d
ered fil ing anywhere other than Michigan, since that is where the firm's headquarters and
much of its operations are.
To be sure, this still leaves a number of firms whose filing in D elaware would be
further away for a majority of creditors than a filing in another plausible location. 1 1 0
G iven that many of these creditors are unlikely to participate in any event, however, and

1 08 . For an effort to quantify the potential inconvenience of a Delaware filing, see Fed
eral judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I J I- 1 2 to I I I-25 (concluding that Delaware is m o re
inconvenient on average than the firm's principal place o f b usiness, though the difference is m uch
smaller when only large creditors are considered) .

1 09. A headquarters-based filing may be quite inconvenient to creditors if, for instance,
the firm's operations are centered in a different state. But this kind of inconvenience is unrelated to
the domicile-based venue issue, since the question here is whether a domicile-based filing under
mines creditors' interests.
1 1 0. As indicated by the evidence analyzed in Federal judicial Center Report, supra note
62, at III- 1 1 to I II-2 5 .
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will be represented in important respects by the creditors committee, it would be a mis
take to eliminate domicile-based venue in an effort to facilitate creditor participation . 1 1 1
This is particularly true if we consider the offsetting benefits of Delaware venue. To the
extent lawmakers wish to encourage creditor involvement, a better approach would be to
approach this goal directly, through measures designed to reduce the cost of participa
tion. 1 1 2

F. Two Alternative Directions for Venue Reform
Roberta Romano has characterized charter competition as the "genius" of cor
porate law. 1 1 3 I have argued throughout this part that although the effect is attenuated i n
bankruptcy, t h e same process also provides grounds for optimism about Delaware's role
in corporate bankruptcy, particularly when we take the effect of Delaware's j udicial cul
ture into account - and that this remains true even in view of concerns about creditor
inconvenience. The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that it would be a mistake t o
eliminate domicile-based venue.
The attenuated nature of the benefits of Delaware bankruptcy does, however,
raise the question whether bankruptcy venue could be adjusted in a way that offered still
greater benefits. In this section, we will briefly consider two possibilities, each of which
would preserve the possibility of Delaware venue.
First, rather than simply permitting debtors to file in their state of incorpora
tion, lawmakers might req uire them to do so. Requiring firms to file in their state of
incorporation would eliminate venue shopping, a n d it would also assure that t he benefits
of charter competition applied more fully to bankruptcy, since a firm's choice of domicile

I l l . The preoccupation with encouraging creditor participation has intriguing parallels
to longstanding efforts in corporate law to use the federal securities laws to promote shareholder
involvemenr in corporate governance. I n the corporate governance context, Easterbrook and Fischel
have argued powerfully that these efforts are costly and unnecessary, since most shareholders are
rational in remaining uni nvolved. Frank H . Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26 J . L. & Econ. 3 9 5 ( 1 98 3 ) .
1 1 2. LoPucki a n d Whitford have suggested several measures of this sort, such a s permit
ting creditors to participate in hearings via telephone. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 62, at 4 9 .
1 1 3 . Romano, supra note 72.
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would determine its bankruptcy venue, j ust as i t determines other aspects o f s tate corpo
rate law. 1 1 4
An obvious concern with this approach (as with the existing appro ach, since i t
permits domicile-based venue) i s that a firm might strategically change its state o f incor
poration on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take advantage of a particularly debto r
friendly venue. The possibility of strategic reincorporation undermines charter competi
tion, the argument goes, because markets will not effectively account for differences in
bankruptcy for a if a firm can make a last-minute switch . 1 1 5 On inspection, this concern
proves quite manageable. Although shareholder or creditor approval of any reincorporation
may not be an effective check, 1 1 6 venue manipulations can be addressed by simply disal
lowing eve of bankruptcy changes of venue. 1 1 7
An additional concern with limiting venue to domicile is that there sometimes

are good reasons for filing in a location other than the state of incorporation. I f the case is
likely co be p ro tracted, for instance, filing near the firm's headquarters or p rincipal p lace
of business may reduce the disruption caused by the bankruptcy process.

1 1 4 . Recall that, in the current venue regime, a firm's venue choice cannot be deter
mined in advance because firms have a variety of venue options at the rime they file for bank
ruptcy. Limiting a firm's venue choice to a single option would improve the market's ability to
account for the relevant bankruptcy regime in pricing rhe firm's stock. This, in turn, would en
hance firms' incentive to seek, and bankruptcy j udges to provide, efficient bankruptcy regulation.
1 1 5 . I n corporate l aw, Lucian Bebchuk has made the analogous argument that the pos
sibility of opportunistic, m idstream charter amendments may undermine the efficiency of corpo
rate law. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Con
straints on Charter A mendments, 1 02 Harv. L. Rev. 1 820 ( 1 9 8 9 ) .
1 1 6 . Shareholder approval i s problematic because shareholders may, l i k e managers, ben
efit from the last-minute switch if the forum is biased in favor of their interests. Skeel, supra note
3, at 544. Creditor voting or a vote of all consistencies alleviates this problem somewhat, bur
would entail an appreciable administrative burden and in practice might prove to be, in essence, a
referendum on the reorganization as a whole.
1 1 7. !d. at 5 44-45 . In fact, the current venue provision already does j ust this, by basing
domicile (as well as principal place of business and assets) on the fi rm's location d uring the major
ity of rhe 1 80-day period before bankruptcy. The provision rhus gives effect o nly to venue shifts
that occur at least ninety days before bankruptcy, since this assures that the firm has been in the
new location for a majority of rhe 1 80-day period. Although one might wish to expand the period
a bit, it nicely prevents last-minute domicile changes.
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A second alternative would be to permit firms to make their venue choice in
advance, by specifying in their certificate o f incorporation where any subsequent bank
ruptcy will be filed . 1 1 8 As with limiting venue to the state of incorporation, the contrac
tual choice approach would harness market forces more effectively than the existing re
gime, s ince investors could price a firm's choice of bankruptcy venue along with the other
factors that influence the value o f a firm's securities. Moreover, in contrast to domicile
only venue, contractual choice would enable a firm to choose a bankruptcy venue that
best fits the profile of the firm.
The principal l imitation of contractual choice is that it assumes a firm can de
termine in advance what kind of bankruptcy regime will prove most efficient. In p ractice,
this may often not be the case. Managers may not have the foresight to know, for in
stance, whether financial problems that arise a decade hence will be best addressed through
a prepackaged bankruptcy (which Delaware currently specializes in) or a more lengthy
renegotiation process (the New York speciality) .
To enhance this approach, lawmakers could permit a firm to change its choice
midstream, subj ect to a shareholder and/or creditor vote. A switching mechanism of this
sort would not only pose an appreciable administrative burden, however, as noted above, 1 1 9
but managers also would o ften face a formidable signaling problem because a decision to
switch bankruptcy venues midstream sends a strong signal as to the precariousness of the
firm's current p rospects . 1 20 What this suggests is that the contractual choice approach is
likely to be most effective i f fi rms generally can determine the most appropriate bank
ruptcy venue well in advance of actual financial distress.
Despite these caveats, both the "domicile-only" and contractual choice approaches
have the important virtues of bringing market forces more fully to bear on the bank
ruptcy process, and thus encouraging bankruptcy j udges to develop a reputation for effi
ciency. As a result, either might improve on the existing regime.

1 18. This is the approach that Rasmussen and Thomas endorse and defend in their
article on the Del aware venue controversy. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 4. As the analysis
bel ow suggests, I also find the approach attractive, but view it as having relatively significant limi
tations.

1 1 9. See supra note 1 1 6 and accompanying text.
1 20. Interestingly, a firm that decides to change its state of incorporation in a domicile
only regime may face less of a signaling problem, because it may be less obvious why the firm has
decided to make the switch.
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From this perspective, the existing regime may b e a second-best app roach. Yet
the current approach does provide at least some o f the benefits of the approaches we have
j ust considered, which underscores the importance o f preserving a domicile-based venue
option. 121

III. PUBLIC CHOICE AND
THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY VENUE
In the last part, we saw that the criticisms of Delaware ven ue are, on the whole,
quite uncompelling. I f this is so, why has the outcry against Delaware ven ue been so
vociferous and widespread? Although concerns about inappropriate ex parte contacts surely
are one factor, at least as important is the pervasive support for change among b ankruptcy
lawyers and bankruptcy j udges. It seems at times as if everyone outside o f Delaware favo rs
the proposed reform.
From a political perspective, the stance o f most bankruptcy lawyers and bank
ruptcy judges i s not surprising. Nearly every prominent case filed in Delaware is a case
that would have landed in a non-Delaware bankruptcy court, and benefitted non-Dela
ware lawyers, were it not for domicile-based venue.
The question we will consider in this part is whether this opposition to Dela
ware venue is likely to prove successful. Thus, we will shift from the normative question
o f whether reform is desirable, to the descriptive issue of whether it is likely. The method
ology I will use throughout the analysis is that of p ublic choice. A fter b riefly describing
the insights o f p ublic choice most relevant to the bankruptcy venue issue, I will integrate
these insights into the historical analysis of the beginning of the article in an effort to
isolate the key political variables in venue reform.

1 2 1 . The analysis of this part also suggests that the venue provision is overly generous in
permitting firms to file in a location where any of their affiliates have filed. B ecause the additional
option of filing in the location of a minor affiliate interferes with the market's ability to accurately
price the effects of different bankruptcy regimes, it would make sense to require that consolidated
filings be made i n the location or domicile of the core business. Although complaints about using
affiliate filings as a "venue hook" seem to have gotten drowned out by the furor over Delaware, the
complaints were j ustified.
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Often described as the "use of economic tools to deal with the traditional prob
lems of p olitical science, " 1 22 public choice s tarts from (or explicitly challenges) the as
sumption char politicians, voters, and o ther relevant actors act in their own self interest . 1 2 3
For politicians, self interest generally means re-election; for voters, it means selecting the
representatives most closely aligned with their interests. Yet general voters face a signifi
cant collective action pro blem : because they have relatively little stake in the outcome of
an election, voters have little incentive to inform themselves. Concentrated interest groups,
by contrast, participate actively in the political process - voting and contributing co
legislators' campaigns, for instance. Because of this, re-election-minded legislators respond
more to interest groups than to voters generally, and interest groups wield disproportion
ace influence.
While interest group theory alone is quite powerful as an explanatory tool, a
more compelling account should take additional factors into account. Many otherwise
apathetic voters may have strong views on some issues - a factor we can loosely define as
ideology. Where chis is so, general voters may have significant influence on the decision
making process. 1 24
For our purposes, the most important extension of chis analysis is the applica
tion of public choice insights to federalism - that is, the division of respo nsibility be
tween Congress and the states. Although Congress might seem ro have an incentive to
legislate in as many areas as possible, federal legislators have left a wide range of issues to
the scares. Why is chis? In an insightful article, Jon Macey argues that in some contexts,
avoiding an issue rather than addressing i t is the best way for Congress to maximize its
rents from interest gro ups. He identifies several areas where self-interested federal legisla
tors will accede to state control . If a state (or states) has developed particularized expertise
or a reputational interest, fo r instance, Congress may obtain more support from local

1 22. Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics
1 040, 1 040 (John Earwell, et al . , eds . , 1 987) .
1 23 . For a much more derailed discussion of public choice analysis, including each of
the points considered in the text that follows, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , Public Choice and the Future
ofPublic Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 647 ( 1 9 97) .
1 24 . See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 9 1 Colum .
L. Rev. 1 0 , 3 1 -32 ( 1 99 1 ) . For discussion of the role of ideology in bankruptcy legislation, see
Skeel, supra note 1 0 .
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regulacors if it agrees co forego federal legislation than it could by i ntervening . 1 25 As his
principal illustration of such a context, Macey cites Delaware's in terest in retaining its
status as the preeminent regulator of corporate law. 1 26
If we apply these insights to the earlier 1 9 30s debate about Delaware venue, the
result is puzzling. Even then, Delaware had a strong interest in state regulation o f corpo
rate law, since Delaware had displaced New Jersey as America's premier corporate address;
and corporate reorganization was very much a part of the Delaware chancery court's
practice. 117 Yet , by the end of the 1 930s, Congress had eliminated firms' ability to look to
their state o f incorporation as a venue option.
Two factors help to explain why Congress eliminated Delaware venue in the
Chandler Act, whereas the New Deal reformers failed in their efforts to p ropose a federal
incorporation statute. 1 2 8 First, Delaware's role in corporate reorganizatio n was quite p re
carious from the beginning. Although the Delaware chancery court developed a well
known expertise in handling equity receiverships, the equity receiverships filed elsewhere
were routinely brought in federal courts in order to avoid the j urisdictional o bstacles
faced by a state courr. 1 19

1 25 . Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation ofFederalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265 , 276- 8 1 ( 1 990) .
Macey also identifies two orher contexts where Congress will defer to the stares: 1 ) if (as with gun
control) rhe support-maximizing approach may vary from stare ro stare; id. ar 28 1 -84; and 2) on
particularly controversial issues (such as abortion), where every approach may b e politically risky.
!d. ar 284-90.

1 26. !d. ar 277-80. As the analysis below will m ake clear, stare regulation o f corporate
law is better explained as a combination of one stare ( Delaware) having a particular interest in
regulation, and o ther stares having a similar though weaker interest in continued state control.
1 27. See supra note 20 and accompanying rexr.
1 28 . While rhe reformers failed ro enact a federal incorporation stature, they did of
course federalize important portions of corporate law through the Securities Act of 1 93 3 and rhe
Securities Exchange Act of 1 934. What they did nor do is eliminate stare charter competition and
stares' general preeminence in corporate law, which was the principal goal of a federal incorpora
tion stature.
1 29 . As noted earlier, rhe most widely-cited description of receivership practice is Cravarh ,
supra note 1 0 . For an argument rhar the shift from stare ro federal courts as rhe forum of choice in
receivership cases reflected federal j udges' efforts to enhance rhe prestige o f rhe federal j udiciary,
see Frank H . B uckley, The American Stay, 3 So. Calif. I nterdisc. L .J . 733 ( 1 994).
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The second, related factor stems from the very different impact that curbing
Delaware's role in corporate reorganization would have on other states, as compared to
taking s imilar action in corporate law generally. I f Congress were to enact a federal incor
poration statute, every state would lose i ts authority over firms incorporated i n the state.
As a result, Delaware had a large number o f potential allies in its efforts to prevent feder
alization of corporate law. 1 30 By contrast, eliminating Delaware venue in corporate reor
ganization would have little adverse impact on other states, since no other state benefitted
from domicile-based venue.
The importance of these factors is plain to see in the events of the 1 930s. Ideol
ogy loomed particul arly l arge during the 1 930s, and on federalism issues in corporate law
rook the form of strident populist criticism of Delaware's authority over firms whose
physical assets were centered in other states. 1 3 1 As we have seen, Delaware was able to
p reserve domicile-based venue for corporate reorganizations in 1 934 due to the happy
accident that the principal player in the reform was a Delaware senator, Senator Daniel
H astings. But Senator Hastings departed in 1 936, and the New Deal reformers elimi
nated Delaware venue (temporarily) in the second wave of reform that produced the
Chandler Act in 1 93 8 .
As always i s the case with public choice analysis, it i s far easier to provide a
coheren t explanation of the past than to o ffer useful predictions for the future. Neverthe
less, our historical analysis does suggest several important lessons fo r the current venue
controversy. First, as in corporate l aw generally, Delaware has a vested interest in attract
ing prominent bankruptcy filings . 1 32 This interest is much more precarious than Delaware's
stake in corporate law, however. Because bankruptcy already is regulated by Congress,
and because other states would l ose little if Delaware lost its status in corporate reorgani
zation, it is not difficult to imagine a successful effort to eliminate domicile-based venue.

1 30. Stated differently, every state is the state of incorporation for many small firms and
at least a few publicly held corporations, and thus has an interest in retaining authority over these
firms.
1 3 1 . See supra notes 24-3 5 and accompanying text.
1 32. Just as the principal opponents of domicile-based venue are non-Delaware bank
ruptcy j udges and bankruptcy lawyers, the principal beneficiaries in Delaware are Delaware's bank
ruptcy j udges and bar.
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Yet Senator Hastings' role i n the early 1 930s illustrates the impo rtance o f a
second factor - the fact that a well-placed legislator may be enough to pro tect D elaware's
interests . 1 3 3 This seems particularly true now, since the liquidity and relative p urity of the
American securities markets has dampened the appeal of populist arguments against
Delaware's role in corporate affairs. For now, at least, Delaware has a present-day equiva
l ent o f Senator Hastings in S enator Joseph Biden, who serves on and p reviously chaired
the Judiciary Committee. So long

as

Senator Biden stays on the committee, even as a

member o f the minority, he can p robably quell venue reform. 1 34 Moreover, even o ff the
j udiciary committee, he could perhaps protect Delaware's status so long as he remains in
the Senate.
Thus, venue reform seems unlikely in the near term, although this could quickly
change in the absence o f Senator Biden, much as the departure o f Senator H astings and
rise o f the Democrats transformed the landscape by the late 1 930s. I n the meantime,
Delaware's bankruptcy j udges almost certainly will temper the practices that have brought
them under fire. As the analysis of this article makes clear, both these changes and Delaware's
likely resilience should be seen as distinctly good news.

1 33 . Where, as in this context, the legislator is well placed due to his or her role on the
relevant oversight committee, the influence is very much related to the role that the committee
structure plays in p reserving legislative bargains. Su, e.g., Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 37;
Barry R . Wei ngast a n d William J . Marshall, The IndustriaL Organization ofCongress: or, Why Legis
Latures, Like Firms, are not organized as Markets, 96 ]. Pol. Econ. 1 32 ( 1 9 88 ) . Because the relevant
committee, here the Judiciary Committee, serves as a gatekeeper, an infl uential member can p re
vent reform from reaching the full House or Senate.
1 34. As evidenced by Senator Hastings' success under these conditions i n 1 934.
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CONCLUSION
I n concluding this analysis, I would like to put venue reform back into the
larger context with which I began. As I noted at the outset of the article, so long as the
existing corporate reorganization framework remains in place, the single m ost important
variable in bankruptcy practice will be the effectiveness of bankruptcy judges . Because
charter competition and Delaware's corporate culture will prod Delaware's j udges in the
right direction, it would be a mistake to eliminate state of incorporation as a venue op
tion.
But the effect of charter competition is attenuated in a variety of ways and is
unlikely to have a nationwide effect. In consequence, it is important to consider other
possible inducements to judicial performance. Attractive candidates include a domicile
only or contract choice approach to venue, or giving bankruptcy creditors a say in the
reappointment process; one can imagine others as well. Even without such changes, how
ever, the quality of bankruptcy j udges has risen noticeably in recent years, and Delaware's
bankruptcy court is an important part of this.

